Overview of Supplementary Materials

This supplement begins with a brief discussion of sample size and statistical power across all Studies and then proceeds with an organization parallel to the main text. Additional information about Study 1 is provided first, followed by information about Study 2, and so on through Study 4. Within the treatment of each Study, we first provide additional information about methods and then provide additional information about results. Additional information about methods consists of the text of prompts, dependent measures, and for Study 2, an expanded description of the experimental procedure. Additional information about analyses consists of expanded reporting of statistical information from the main text.

Sample Size and Statistical Power

We examined three conceptual groups of effects. We examined (a) the impact of being forgotten or remembered in isolation from competing contextual influences (i.e., in experiments), (b) moderation of this base effect, and (c) the impact of being remembered or forgotten when embedded in an ecologically valid context. Each of these effects required different considerations around statistical power.

For base effects in experimental contexts (i.e., no moderation), our pilot work suggested large effect sizes (Cohen’s $d = 1.2$). In the current paper, Study 2 falls under this estimate and thus has a relatively small sample size. For studies of moderation, we did not have a good estimate of effect size ahead of time. We thus obtained sample sizes sufficient to detect substantially reduced effect sizes (Cohen’s $d > .2$). Similarly, we did not have a good estimate of effect size for the study of being forgotten in ecologically valid contexts. We thus employed a method likely to yield sufficient power to detect small effects (diary data with 14 repeated measurements), although we could not be certain of the exact level of power without knowing the frequency with which we would observe being forgotten.

Study 1
We expand on the methods reported in the main text by providing the full text of the diary prompt and the full text of the dependent measures used in Study 1. We expand on the statistical reporting of the main text by providing additional details about analysis of participants’ open ended feelings.

**Daily Diary Prompt**

Participants were informed that the study concerned their experiences of being forgotten by others each day as well as their general feelings during the day. Participants were also asked to complete the diary every night as close to when they went to bed as possible for 14 days and were encouraged not to discuss their responses with others.

To capture the full range of participants’ experiences, they were provided with the following instructions:

“In the first part of the diary, you will answer some questions about your experiences of being forgotten by other people today. These could be situations in which someone you know does not immediately recognize you, forgets your name or personal details, or forgets a past interaction you had with them either partially or completely. These could also be situations in which someone misremembers something about you – such as calling you by a different name or misremembering which city you were born in. Please answer the questions separately for *each* incident that occurred today, regardless of how trivial or inexplicable it might seem to be.”

**Closed-Ended Dependent Measures**

**Relational variables.** Participants completed closed-ended ratings of their feelings about the relationship with the person who forgot them. We assessed perceived importance with two items (i.e., “How important did you feel to this person after the incident?” and
“How much do you think this person values you after the incident?”). Participants also rated their feelings of closeness to the person who forgot them with two items (i.e., “How close did you feel to this person after the incident?” and “How much did you like this person after the incident?”). Finally, participants completed two items assessing their perceptions of the other person’s feelings of closeness to them (i.e., “How much do you think the person likes you after the incident?” and “How close did this person feel to you after the incident?”). Participants completed these items on a 7-point scale from 1 = much less than before to 7 = much more than before, with the scale midpoint of 4 = same as before.

**Daily need satisfaction.** Participants completed 21 items assessing their satisfaction of interpersonal and intrapersonal needs, mood, and interaction quality each day. To measure belongingness needs, six items assessed the degree to which participants felt included and accepted by others (i.e., “Accepted by other people,” “Lonely,” “Rejected,” “Hurt,” Isolated from others,” and “Close to other people,” with negative items reverse-scored; adapted from Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014). To measure perceived importance to others, three items assessed the degree to which participants felt valued and significant to others (i.e., “Valued by other people,” “Significant to people,” and “Not important to other people,” with the negative item reverse-scored). In addition, six items measured the intrapersonal needs of self-esteem, perceived control, and meaningful existence. Two items assessed daily self-esteem (i.e., “Good about myself” and “Unsure of myself,” negative item reverse-scored, from Murray, Bellavia, Rose, & Griffin, 2003). Two additional items assessed perceived control (i.e., “In control” and “Unable to do what I wanted,” negative item reverse-scored) and two items assessed meaningful existence (i.e., “My life has a clear sense of purpose” and “Non-existent,” negative item reverse-scored; adapted from Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). We also assessed positive mood with three items (i.e., “Happy,” “Energetic,” and “Relaxed”) and negative mood with two items (i.e., “Sad” and “Uneasy/anxious”) adapted from Murray
et al. (2003). All of the aforementioned items were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = especially). Finally, we assessed the overall quality of participants’ social interactions that day on a 7-point scale (1 = terrible, 7 = terrific).

Expanded Reporting of Results

Multilevel tests of relational variables.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Just met/Acquaintance vs. Friend/Family/Partner</th>
<th>Classmate/Roommate/Coworker vs. Friend/Family Romantic Partner</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felt Importance</td>
<td>( b = -0.004, t(198.04) = -0.05 )</td>
<td>( b = -0.031, t(204.93) = -0.35 )</td>
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<td>Closeness</td>
<td>( b = 0.01, t(221.99) = 0.15 )</td>
<td>( b = 0.02, t(233.53) = 0.21 )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived Closeness</td>
<td>( b = -0.05, t(276.05) = -0.75 )</td>
<td>( b = -0.02, t(269.68) = -0.27 )</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Open-ended general feelings. Coders first counted the number of discrete feelings that participants reported in each description and then categorized each emotion into one of four categories (i.e., negative, positive, neutral, or surprised). We then examined the total counts for each category. First, we tested whether these reactions differed in frequency. To answer this question, we summed participants’ reports of these emotions across the 14-day diary period. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that the frequency of the four themes differed significantly, \( F(3, 165) = 28.30, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .34, 95\% CI[.24, .41] \). We then tested differences between categories using pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. As expected, participants were most likely to report negative emotions in response to being forgotten. Negative reactions (\( M = 5.05, SE = .60 \)) were significantly more likely than positive reactions (\( M = 0.96, SE = .18 \)), \( t(55) = 6.92, p < .001 \), Cohen’s \( d = 1.24 \), and surprised reactions (\( M = 1.62, SE = .23 \)), \( t(55) = 5.35, p < .001 \), Cohen’s \( d = 1.01 \),
but were not significantly more likely than neutral reactions ($M = 3.96$, $SE = .34$), $t(55) = 1.65$, $p = .625$, Cohen’s $d = 0.30$. Neutral reactions were also more likely than surprised reactions, $t(55) = 5.59$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 1.06$, and positive reactions, $t(55) = 8.57$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 1.47$, which did not significantly differ from each other, $t(55) = 2.26$, $p = .166$, Cohen’s $d = 0.43$. In sum, these findings suggest that being forgotten is generally a subjectively negative or neutral experience.

**Open-ended feelings about relationship.** We conducted the same analyses for participants’ open-ended descriptions of their feelings towards person who forgot them. We coded these descriptions into the four categories described above (i.e., negative, positive, neutral, and surprised) and tested whether these categories differed in frequency across the diary period. Again, participants reported experiencing the four categories of feelings at significantly different rates, $F(3, 165) = 25.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .318$, 95% CI [.21, .39]. Consistent with our expectations, participants were most likely to experience negative feelings towards the person who forgot them. Negative reactions ($M = 4.55$, $SE = .58$) were significantly more common than positive reactions ($M = 2.68$, $SE = .38$), $t(55) = 3.11$, $p = .018$, Cohen’s $d = 0.50$, and surprised reactions ($M = 0.29$, $SE = .094$), $t(55) = 7.20$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 1.37$, but not more common than neutral reactions ($M = 4.05$, $SE = .37$), $t(55) = 0.80$, $p = 1.00$, Cohen’s $d = 0.13$. Neutral reactions were the second most frequent response, and were marginally more likely than positive reactions, $t(55) = 2.48$, $p = .097$, Cohen’s $d = 0.49$, and significantly more likely than surprised reactions, $t(55) = 9.76$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 1.87$. Participants were also significantly more likely to feel positively towards the person who forgot them than surprised, $t(55) = 6.28$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 1.23$. Consistent with participants’ general subjective experience during the incidents and with our hypothesis that being forgotten reduces relationship closeness (path B, Figure 1, in the main text), the relational impact of being forgotten also appeared to most frequently be negative or neutral.
Daily intrapersonal needs. Analysis of individual intrapersonal needs yielded mixed outcomes. The frequency of being forgotten did not significantly predict participants’ daily self-esteem ($b = -.13, SE = .08, t(417.24) = -1.67, p = .095$) or sense of personal control ($b = -.12, SE = .08, t(448.25) = -1.45, p = .147$). However, consistent with King and Geise (2011), being forgotten decreased participants’ sense that their lives had meaning, $b = -.13, SE = .06, t(420.20) = -2.24, p = .026$.

Study 2

We expand on the methods reported in the main text by providing additional description of the experimental procedure and the full text of the dependent measures used in Study 2. We expand on the statistical reporting of the main text by providing repeated measures analysis of Time 1 and Time 2 scores as well as by additional statistical reporting related to mediational analysis. Note that a failure of random assignment in importance is evident at Time 1, but this initial difference does not explain or qualify the subsequent change in importance after the memory manipulation.

Expanded Description of Procedure

Interaction task. Participants were told that they would be completing a “Getting to Know You” study with another participant. In reality, participants interacted with a confederate posing as another participant. After the experimenter explained the study and left the room, participants sat at a table with the confederate and completed a task designed to induce closeness between new acquaintances. This task consisted of a series of increasingly intimate question-and-answer exchanges taken from the Closeness-Generating Inventory (Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997) and the Relationship Closeness Induction Task (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1999). The confederate was trained to answer all the questions from a script to ensure standardization of responses. To increase its
authenticity, this script was based on various individuals’ answers to the questions from a pilot study.

The confederate’s questions to the participant were as follows: (1) Where are you from? (2) What subject do you study? (3) If you could travel anywhere in the world, where would you go and why? (4) What is one of your biggest fears? (5) If you could wake up tomorrow having gained one quality or ability, what would it be and why? (6) Your house containing everything you own catches fire. After saving your loved ones and pets, you have time to safely make a final dash to save any one item. What would it be? Why?

Participants’ questions to the confederate and the confederate’s responses were as follows: (1) How old are you? I am 20. (2) What year are you in? I am in 2nd year. (3) What is something you have always wanted to do but probably will never be able to do? I always wanted to get married to my high school sweetheart. (4) What is one recent accomplishment you are proud of? Oh I am not sure, probably my exam results. (5) If you could change anything about the way you were raised, what would it be and why? Hmm, I had to move house a lot when I was younger. I wish I had stayed in the one place because every time I had to try and make new friends and I lost my old ones. (6) What, if anything, is too serious to be joked about? Cancer. One of my relatives actually died of it so it’s quite important to me.”

Information exchange. After the initial interaction, the participant and confederate were separated into different rooms. Participants then completed a 20-item version of Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) as a filler task. Next, participants completed the first questionnaire. This questionnaire included an open-ended prompt for participants to list as many of the confederate’s answers as they could remember from the interaction task. Additionally, the questionnaire contained measures of participants’ perceived importance to the confederate, liking of the confederate, and enjoyment of the interaction. These items were on a separate page from the rest of the questionnaire.
After participants finished the first questionnaire, the experimenter returned with confederate and instructed the participant and the confederate to exchange their questionnaires by removing the first page of the questionnaire and handing it to one another. Participants were asked not to read the confederate’s answers until after the confederate had left the room again. Once the confederate left the room, the experimenter informed participants that they would not see the confederate again and that their remaining responses were completely confidential.

**Memory manipulation.** While participants were completing the first questionnaire, the confederate completed two versions of the same questionnaire – a forgetting version and a remembering version. These questionnaires were partially filled out prior to the experiment with standardized ratings of perceived importance, liking, and interaction enjoyment created from averaging the responses from 5 pilot study participants. On this questionnaire, the items evaluating the participant and the interaction were variously marked with a 4 or 5 on a 7-point scale.

The open-ended recall item was completed during each experimental session. In the forgetting version of the questionnaire, the confederate wrote down: “I’ve forgotten most of what they said. Sorry!” In the remembering version, the confederate listened to an audio-recording of the interaction and wrote down 5/6 of the participant’s actual answers. The answer to one question (i.e., where the participant was from) was removed to increase the believability of the questionnaires.

Which questionnaire the participant then received was determined by double blind random assignment. The blind assignment system was generated by a third party (uninvolved in the daily running of the experiment) prior to the session. First, participant numbers were randomly assigned to condition. Next two lists were generated from the pairing of participant number and condition. The confederate consulted one list to determine whether to label the
memory or forgetting questionnaire ‘A’ or ‘B.’ The experimenter then consulted the second list to determine which version, ‘A’ or ‘B,’ to give to participants. In interviews, experiment personnel indicated that they were unable to determine participant’s condition until it was revealed to them at data analysis.

After reading the confederate’s questionnaire, participants completed the second questionnaire. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, assured that the confederate never saw participants’ ratings of her, and thanked for their participation in the study.

**Dependent Measures**

**Importance.** At each time point, participants completed three items (α = .81 at Time 1, α = .91 at Time 2) assessing perceptions of importance to the confederate (i.e., “How important do you think your answers were to your interaction partner?” “How much do you think your partner valued what you were saying?” and “How significant were your answers to your interaction partner?”). Participants rated these items on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *a great deal*).

**Inclusion of other in the self and Liking.** At each time point, participants completed a modified version of the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). This item asked participants to choose one of seven progressively overlapping circles that best described their relationship with their interaction partner based on their previous interaction. This measure is thought to capture psychological overlap or connection between people in relationships. Two items assessed liking of the confederate at each time point (α = .79 at Time 1, α = .75 at Time 2). The first item, “How much did you like your interaction partner?” was adapted from Sprecher, Treger, Wondra, Hilaire, and Wallpe (2013). The second item, “I feel that I would enjoy working in another class experiment with this person.”
was adapted from the Interpersonal Judgment Scale (Byrne, 1971). Participants completed each item on a 7-point scale (1=not at all; 7=a great deal).

**Enjoyment of interaction.** Participants completed two items assessing how much they enjoyed the interaction with the confederate (“How much did you enjoy the interaction?” “How much did you enjoy your role in the interaction?”) on 7-point scales (1=not at all; 7=a great deal). This measure was reliable at Time 1 (α = .83) and at Time 2 (α = .78).

**State self-esteem.** The 20-item State Self-Esteem measure (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) assessed participants’ transient feelings of self-worth at Time 1 (α = .88) and Time 2 (α = .91). Participants responded to questions assessing their state feelings about their academic performance (e.g., “I feel as smart as others.”), social evaluation (e.g., “I feel that others respect and admire me.”), and appearance (e.g., “I feel unattractive.”) on a 5-point scale (1=not at all, 5=extremely).

**Meaning in life.** Participants completed the 10-item Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), which includes Presence of Meaning (α = .88, e.g., “I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.”) and Search for Meaning (α = .90, e.g., “I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.”) subscales. Participants were asked to “take a moment to think about what makes your life feel important to you” and rate each question on a 7-point scale (1 = absolutely untrue; 7 = absolutely true).

**Expanded Reporting of Results**

Table S2. Means and Standard Errors for the Relational Dependent Measures by Each Memory Condition Before and After the Manipulation in Study 2

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To test our hypothesis that being forgotten would decrease participants’ perceived importance to the confederate, we used a mixed-model factorial ANOVA with time (Time 1 or Time 2) as a within-subjects factor and memory condition (forgotten or remembered) as a between-subjects factor. Table S2 presents the means and standard errors in each condition. The analysis revealed a main effect of time, $F(1, 42) = 8.96, p = .005, \eta^2_p = 0.18$, 95% CI [.03, .33], such that participants felt more important to the confederate before the manipulation ($M = 3.63, SE = .16$) than after ($M = 3.19, SE = .14$). There was also a main effect of memory condition, $F(1, 42) = 37.88, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.47$, 95% CI [.28, .60], such that participants felt more important to the confederate overall in the remembered condition ($M = 4.22, SE = .19$) than in the forgotten condition ($M = 2.60, SE = .18$). As predicted, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between time and memory condition, $F(1, 42) = 18.90, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.31$, 95% CI [.12, .46].

We first decomposed this interaction by examining the simple effects of memory condition at Time 1 and Time 2. Unexpectedly, participants felt more important to the confederate in the remembered condition than in the forgotten condition at Time 1, $F(1, 42) = 9.38, p = .004, \eta^2_p = 0.18$, 95% CI [.04, .34]. Given that these ratings were obtained before the manipulation and that participants had not yet been assigned to condition, this finding can only reflect a failure of random assignment on this variable. Critically, our hypothesis was about changes in perceived importance over time rather than absolute perceived importance. Thus, we next tested whether importance ratings changed from Time 1 to Time 2 in each of

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>4.12</th>
<th>0.24</th>
<th>4.32</th>
<th>0.21</th>
<th>.36</th>
<th>3.14</th>
<th>0.22</th>
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<td>0.25</td>
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<td>.002</td>
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</table>

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the two memory conditions. Consistent with predictions, participants’ feelings of importance decreased after the manipulation when they had been forgotten by the confederate, $F(1, 42) = 29.63, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.41, 95\% CI[.22, .55]$. However, there was no change in participants’ feelings of importance when they had been remembered by the confederate, $F(1, 42) = 0.84, p = .364, \eta^2_p = 0.02, 95\% CI[< -.001, .13]$. These findings support our hypothesis that being forgotten leads to inferences of reduced importance.

Liking and Inclusion of other in self. We tested whether being forgotten would have negative interpersonal consequences by first examining whether the memory manipulation affected liking of the confederate. Again, we used a mixed factorial ANOVA with time as a within-subjects factor and memory condition as a between-subjects factor. This test revealed a significant main effect of time, $F(1, 42) = 25.09, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.37, 95\% CI[.18, .52]$, such that participants liked the confederate significantly more before the manipulation ($M = 5.44, SE = .17$) than after ($M = 4.83, SE = .15$). In addition, there was also a main effect of memory condition, $F(1, 42) = 4.59, p = .038, \eta^2_p = 0.10, 95\% CI[.003, .25]$, such that participants liked the confederate more when she remembered information about them ($M = 4.81, SE = .20$) than when she forgot information about them ($M = 5.45, SE = .22$). However, as predicted, these effects were qualified by a significant time by memory condition interaction, $F(1, 42) = 6.45, p = .015, \eta^2_p = 0.13, 95\% CI[.01, .29]$.

As expected, participants’ liking of the confederate decreased over time in the forgotten condition (see Table S2). That is, participants liked the confederate significantly less after the confederate had forgotten information about them, $F(1, 42) = 31.33, p < .001, \eta^2_p = 0.43, 95\% CI[.23, .56]$. In contrast, participants in the remembered condition reported liking the confederate equally before and after the manipulation, $F(1, 42) = 2.80, p = .102, \eta^2_p = 0.06, 95\% CI[< -.001, .20]$. 
We next examined whether our manipulations influenced participants’ feelings of self-other overlap with the confederate. This measure showed the same pattern as that present in liking, but the condition by time interaction did not reach statistical significance. Specifically, the omnibus ANOVA showed a main effect of time, $F(1, 41) = 10.59, p = .002$, $\eta^2_p = .20$, 95% CI[.05, .36], such that participants felt more psychologically linked to the confederate at Time 1 ($M = 3.22, SE = .18$) than at Time 2 ($M = 2.72, SE = .14$), but no main effect of condition, $F(1, 41) = 2.58, p = .12$, $\eta^2_p = .06$, 95% CI[0, .23], and no interaction, $F(1, 41) = 1.67, p = .20$, $\eta^2_p = .04$, 95% CI[< -.001, .17]. Direct analysis of changes over time by condition indicated that, within the forgotten condition, participants included their interaction partner in the self significantly less after the manipulation than before, $F(1, 41) = 11.11, p = .002$, $\eta^2_p = 0.21$, 95% CI[.05, .37], whereas there was no change in the remembered condition, $F(1, 41) = 1.78, p = .187$, $\eta^2_p = 0.04$, 95% CI[< -.001, .17]. The results for self-other overlap thus appear to parallel those for liking but are somewhat weaker.

In order to assess the overall robustness of our findings we subjected liking and self-other overlap to a MANOVA with a factor structure identical to the above ANOVAs but with liking and self-other overlap treated as different measures of the underlying construct of relationship quality. Consistent with hypotheses, this MANOVA yielded the predicted condition by time interaction, $F(1, 41) = 5.01, p = .030$, $\eta^2_p = 0.10$, 95% CI[.01, .26], in addition to a main effect of condition, $F(1, 41) = 6.18, p = .017$, $\eta^2_p = 0.12$, 95% CI[.01, .26], and a main effect of time, $F(1, 41) = 22.87, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = 0.34$, 95% CI[.16, .50]. Although the results of the MANOVA support our hypotheses, we suspect that liking might be a more appropriate measure of relationship quality than self-other overlap in the context of newly-formed interpersonal relationships. The cognitive interdependence represented by self-other overlap is characteristic of long-term interpersonal relationships (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991) and so might be less applicable than liking to interpersonal relationships with a
short history of interaction. This point is not vital to interpretation of the present results, however, because inferential analysis unambiguously indicated that forgetting damaged relationship quality as indexed by liking alone or as indexed by the combination of liking and self-other overlap.

**Mediational analysis.** In order to test our model’s prediction that the effects of being forgotten on participants’ inferences of subjective importance led to changes in liking for the confederate, we conducted a mediational analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) examining the indirect effects of memory condition on liking through inferred importance. In order to include a repeated measures factor in the mediational analysis, comparisons across time were represented as difference scores (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001).

The indirect effects of memory condition and importance on liking are shown in Figure S1. In a regression framework, the relationship between the memory manipulation and changes in liking for the confederate corresponded to a regression coefficient of $b = -0.62$, $p = .015$, and the relationship between the memory manipulation and inferences of subjective importance corresponded to a coefficient of $b = -1.28$, $p < .001$. Consistent with the assumption that changes in subjective importance led to changes in liking, predicting liking from both memory condition and importance at the same time eliminated the relationship between memory condition and liking, $b = 0.06$, $p = .795$, while the relationship between importance and liking remained strong and significant, $b = 0.53$, $p < .001$. Formal assessment of the indirect effects using bootstrapping (1000 resamples) estimated a coefficient of $b = -0.69$, with a 95% CI$[-1.41, -0.27]$ that did not contain zero. This analysis is consistent with evidence of memory exerting its effects on liking through inferences of subjective importance. Note that parallel analysis of a standardized aggregate measure of liking and self-other overlap yielded comparable outcomes.
Figure S1. The indirect effect of memory on liking through importance, Study 2.

Unstandardized slopes are presented with standard errors in parentheses. Solid lines represent significant relationships. Memory has strong indirect effects on liking through importance. The relationship between memory and liking is initially strong but weakens to non-significance after controlling for importance. The relationships between memory and importance and between importance and liking remain strong and significant.

**Enjoyment of the interaction.** Next, we tested the effects of the memory manipulation on enjoyment of the interaction. This test revealed a significant main effect of time, $F(1, 42) = 8.45, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .17, 95\% CI[.03, .33]$, such that participants enjoyed the interaction more before the manipulation ($M = 5.11, SE = .17$) than after the manipulation ($M = 4.81, SE = .14$). There was also a main effect of memory condition, $F(1, 42) = 6.03, p = .018, \eta_p^2 = .13, 95\% CI[.01, .33]$. Across time points, participants in the remembered condition ($M = 5.31, SE = .21$) enjoyed the interaction with the confederate more than participants in the forgotten condition ($M = 4.60, SE = .19$). The time by memory condition interaction was not significant, $F(1, 42) = 0.08, p = .78, \eta_p^2 = .002, 95\% CI[< -.001, .06]$.

**State self-esteem.** There was no effect of the memory manipulation, $F(1, 42) = 0.06, p = .82, \eta_p^2 = .00, 95\% CI[< -.001, .06]$, time, $F(1, 42) = 0.78, p = .382, \eta_p^2 = .02, 95\% CI[< -.001, .13]$, or the interaction between the memory manipulation and time, $F(1, 42) = 1.41, p = .242, \eta_p^2 = .03, 95\% CI[< -.001, .16]$ on State Self-Esteem.

**Study 3**
We expand on the methods reported in the main text by providing the full text of the scenarios and dependent measures used in Study 3. We expand on the results reported in the main text by providing analysis of a manipulation check omitted from the main text, by providing full text of the dependent measures from the main text, and by providing additional detail about mediational analysis.

**Full Text of Vignettes**

Each vignette consisted of backstory and dialog. Remembering and forgetting were manipulated in the dialog. Attributions were manipulated in the backstory. The key associated text is underlined below but was not underlined during presentation to participants. The five conditions were created by pairing each of the four backstories with the forgetting dialog and by additionally pairing the no attribution backstory with the remembering dialog.

**Backstory.**

*No attribution information.* Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been friends ever since. They sometimes go to the local gym together, go out for drinks, and do a few other things together. Recently, Alex offered to lend Chris money to pay rent after Chris lost her job.

*Dispositional attribution.* Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been friends ever since. They sometimes go to the local gym together, go out for drinks, and do a few other things together. **Alex tends to be quite forgetful.** Recently, Alex offered to lend Chris money to pay rent after Chris lost her job.

*Situational attribution.* Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been friends ever since. They sometimes go to the local gym together, go out for drinks, and do a few other things together. **Alex has been quite busy and overworked lately.** Recently, Alex offered to lend Chris money to pay rent after Chris lost her job.
Relational attribution. Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been friends ever since. They sometimes go to the local gym together, go out for drinks, and do a few other things together. Alex often does not pay close attention in conversations with Chris, although this is not something Alex does with other people. Recently, Alex offered to lend Chris money to pay rent after Chris lost her job.

**Dialog.**

*Remembering.*

ALEX: Hey Chris, how is the job hunt going?

CHRIS: Actually it’s going well! I found out yesterday that I got that job at the university.

ALEX: That’s great! I’m glad it worked out.

CHRIS: Me too. Thanks for offering to help out with my rent this month. This is kind of awkward, but did you bring the cheque?

ALEX: Of course! Like I said, I am more than happy to help you out.

CHRIS: Thanks, I really appreciate it. Now that I have a job I’ll be able to pay you back soon.

*Forgetting.*

ALEX: Hey Chris, how is the job hunt going?

CHRIS: Actually it’s going well! I found out yesterday that I got that job at the university.

ALEX: That’s great! I’m glad it worked out.

CHRIS: Me too. Thanks for offering to help out with my rent this month. This is kind of awkward, but did you bring the cheque?

ALEX: No, sorry, I completely forgot I said I would do that! Can I bring it next time we see each other? I am more than happy to help you out.

CHRIS: Thanks, I really appreciate it. Now that I have a job I’ll be able to pay you back soon.

Dependent Measures
**Importance.** Three items assessed participants’ perceptions of the importance of the conversation to the communicator in each scenario (i.e., “How important to Alex was Alex and Chris’s conversation about promising to lend Chris money?” “How much did Alex value Alex and Chris's conversation about promising to lend Chris money?” and “How significant to Alex was Alex and Chris's conversation about promising to lend Chris money?”). These items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) and were strongly associated for each scenario (average α = .81, SD = .02).

**Closeness.** Six items (average α = .80, SD = .06; adapted from Rusbult, 1983) measured participants’ perceptions of the target’s closeness to the communicator in each vignette (e.g., “This relationship is rewarding for Chris,” “In general, Chris has invested a great deal in Alex,” “Chris likes Alex very much,” “Chris is satisfied with this relationship,” “Chris is committed to this relationship,” and “Chris would like this relationship to last a lifetime”). Participants rated the items on 7-point scales, where 1 = disagree strongly and 7 = agree strongly.

**Inferred memory.** Participants completed one item evaluating the effectiveness of the memory manipulation in the vignette, “How well does Alex remember promising to lend Chris money?” Participants rated this item on a 7-point scale from 1 (does not remember at all) to 7 (completely remembers).

**Attributions.** One item concurrently assessed the effectiveness of the attribution manipulation and the attributions participants made when attribution information was not supplied in the scenarios, “Why do you think Alex forgets/remembers promising to lend Chris money?” Participants selected one of three possible options, corresponding to dispositional (i.e. ‘Alex’s personality’), situational (i.e., ‘Alex’s situation or circumstances’), and relational attributions (i.e., ‘How Alex feels about Chris’).

**Expanded Reporting of Results**
Inferred memory. As expected, the memory manipulation effectively altered participants’ perceptions of the extent to which communicators remembered targets, $F(4, 320) = 90.04, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .53, 95\% \text{ CI} [.45, .58]$. A Student-Newman-Keuls test indicated that communicators remembered targets better in the remembered condition ($M = 6.25, SE = .18$) than in the no attribution condition ($M = 2.55, SE = .20$), dispositional attribution condition ($M = 2.51, SE = .18$), situational attribution condition ($M = 3.18, SE = .18$), and relational attribution condition ($M = 2.12, SE = .18$). Surprisingly, the SNK test also showed that communicators remembered targets better in the situational attribution condition than in the other three forgetting conditions. All other conditions did not differ from one another.

Importance. A one-way ANOVA with five levels revealed the expected effect of condition, $F(4, 320) = 28.51, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .26, 95\% \text{ CI} [.19, .32]$. We explored this effect with planned contrasts. We first verified that there were no detectable differences between the no explanation condition ($M = 3.77, SE = .18$), the dispositional explanation condition ($M = 3.81, SE = .17$), and the situational explanation condition ($M = 4.09, SE = .16$), all $ps > .18$. In order to assess our hypothesis that non-relational attributions for forgetting reduce the impact of being forgotten on inferred importance relative to relational attributions (path C, Figure 1, main text), we then collapsed across the three non-relational forgetting conditions and compared them to the relational explanation condition ($M = 3.26, SE = .16$). As expected and consistent with moderation by attribution, relational explanations for forgetting led to significantly less inferred importance than did the non-relational explanations for forgetting, $F(1, 320) = 11.19, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .04, 95\% \text{ CI} [.01, .07]$. Finally, in order to evaluate the degree to which mitigating attributions reduced the impact of forgetting relative to being remembered, we again collapsed across the three non-relational forgetting conditions, and compared them to the remembering condition ($M = 5.53, SE = .16$). As expected and consistent with Study 1, participants inferred significantly more importance in the
remembering condition than in the three non-relational forgetting conditions, $F(1, 320) = 76.83, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .19, 95\% CI[.13, .25]$.

**Closeness.** We expected a pattern of relationship closeness parallel to that observed for importance. A one-way ANOVA again revealed an effect of condition, $F(4, 320) = 8.70, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10, 95\% CI[.04, .14]$. Preliminary comparisons of the non-relational forgetting conditions, however, revealed an unexpected difference between the situational attribution condition ($M = 5.06, SE = .12$) and the dispositional attribution condition ($M = 4.66, SE = .12$), $t(129) = 2.44, p = .015$, Cohen’s $d = 0.42$. We thus reverted to an exploratory Student-Newman-Keuls post-hoc test. This test indicated that inferred closeness in the remembering condition ($M = 5.50, SE = .11$) was significantly higher than in all other conditions including the no information condition, ($M = 4.98, SE = .13$). With the post-hoc correction, there was no significant difference between the three non-relational attribution conditions. Additionally, although the relational attribution condition ($M = 4.72, SE = .11$) was descriptively lower than the non-relational attribution conditions, it did not differ from them significantly.

**Mediational analysis.** The indirect effects of memory condition and importance on closeness are shown in Figure S2. In a regression framework, the relationship between the memory condition and inferred closeness corresponded to a regression coefficient of $b = -0.65, p < .001$, and the relationship between memory condition and inferences of subjective importance corresponded to a coefficient of $b = -1.81, p < .001$. Consistent with the assumption that the effects of memory condition on subjective importance led to differences in inferred closeness, predicting closeness from both memory condition and importance substantially reduced the relationship between memory and closeness, $b = -0.08, p = .55$, while the relationship between importance and closeness remained strong and significant, $b = 0.32, p < .001$. Formal assessment of the indirect effect of memory through perceived
importance using bootstrapping (1000 resamples) estimated a coefficient of $b = -0.57$, with a 95% CI $[-0.77, -0.42]$ that did not contain zero. This analysis is consistent with evidence of memory exerting its effects on inferred closeness through inferences of subjective importance.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure S2.** The indirect effect of memory on closeness through importance, Study 3.

Unstandardized slopes are presented with standard errors in parentheses. Solid lines represent significant relationships. Memory has strong indirect effects on closeness through importance. The relationship between memory and closeness is initially strong but weakens to non-significance after controlling for importance. The relationships between memory and importance and between importance and closeness remain strong and significant.

**Study 4**

We expand on the methods reported in the main text by providing the full text of the scenarios used in Study 4 and discussing a change in the dependent measures between Study 3 and Study 4. We expand on the results reported in the main text by providing analysis of a manipulation check omitted from the main text and by providing additional detail about mediational analysis.

**Full Text of Vignettes**

As in Study 3, each vignette consisted of backstory and dialog. Remembering and forgetting were manipulated in the dialog. Initial relationship closeness was manipulated in the backstory. The remembered or forgotten information (i.e., the target information) was
also presented in backstory following the closeness manipulation. This information was constant across all conditions. Six between-subjects conditions were created by factorial combination of the three backstories with the forgetting or remembering dialog.

**Relationship backstory.**

*High closeness relationship.* Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been really good friends ever since. The two like to spend a lot of their spare time together. They usually go to the local gym together, go out for drinks, go on weekend trips, and do many other things together. They forged a strong bond with one another and they always ask the other person for advice when dealing with significant matters. They usually share important personal information with one another and can confide in one another. Neither Alex nor Chris could imagine what their lives would be without this friendship.

*Medium closeness relationship.* Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been friends ever since. They like to meet every once in a while to catch up. They sometimes go to the local gym together, go out for drinks, and do a few other things together. They get along well with one another and they often ask the other person for their opinion when dealing with urgent matters. They sometimes share personal information with one another. Both Alex and Chris are happy to be part of each other’s lives.

*Low closeness relationship.* Alex and Chris attended the same high-school and have been casual friends ever since. They don’t get to spend a lot of time together, but they do bump into one another occasionally and stop for a chat. They don’t get to do many things together, but keep on planning to go to the local gym or out for a drink at some point. They didn’t connect strongly with one another, but they do enjoy each other’s company, and on rare occasions they ask each other for advice. Only rarely do they share personal information with one another. Both Alex and Chris appreciate the relationship even though it is not a big part of their lives.
Target information. At a food festival they once attended, Chris had told Alex she was allergic to peanuts and couldn’t eat the cakes at the event. Today, Alex and Chris both attended a dinner where all the guests shared their favourite dishes.

Dialog.

Remembering.

CHRIS: Hey Alex! I’m looking forward to dinner.

ALEX: Me too! What did you bring?

CHRIS: I brought some fish pie. It’s my mum’s recipe. What about you?

ALEX: Well, I actually brought some peanut butter biscuits. I know you’re allergic to peanuts but I knew someone else was bringing chocolate biscuits too. You should try them, they’re really good.

CHRIS: Excellent! I can’t wait to try them.

Forgetting.

CHRIS: Hey Alex! I’m looking forward to dinner.

ALEX: Me too! What did you bring?

CHRIS: I brought some fish pie. It’s my mum’s recipe. What about you?

ALEX: Oh… I forgot that you told me that. I’m sorry about that, but someone else brought chocolate biscuits that you could have instead. They’re really good.

CHRIS: Excellent! I can’t wait to try them.
Dependent Measures

The dependent measures in Study 4 were identical to those in Study 3 with one exception. In Study 3, the closeness items asked about the feelings of the person who was forgotten (Chris). This format required participants to indicate how they thought Chris would feel rather than directly assessing participants’ inferences about what memory signaled. In Study 4, the closeness items asked about the feelings of the person who forgot or remembered (Alex). In Study 4, participants were thus asked to directly interpret what the memory information signaled about the relationship instead of being asked how they thought someone would react to being remembered or forgotten.

Both the importance items (average $\alpha = .87$, $SD = .08$) and the closeness items (average $\alpha = .89$, $SD = .06$) were strongly associated for each scenario.

Expanded Reporting of Results

Inferred memory. As expected, the memory manipulation effectively altered participants’ perceptions of the extent to which communicators remembered targets, $F(1, 280) = 993.19$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .78$, 95% CI[.76, .81]. Participants indicated that the communicator remembered targets better in the remembered conditions ($M = 6.24$, $SE = .11$) than in the forgotten conditions ($M = 1.65$, $SE = .10$). There was, however, relatively small variation in the amount of memory portrayed for different levels of relationship closeness, $F(2, 280) = 6.49$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, 95% CI[.01, .09]. Participants indicated that the target was better remembered when the pair in the vignette had a very close relationship ($M = 4.32$, $SE = .13$) than when the pair had a moderately close relationship ($M = 3.73$, $SE = .14$), $p = .002$, or a casual relationship ($M = 3.79$, $SE = .11$), $p = .002$, with no difference between the latter two types of relationship, $p = .728$. The main effects were not qualified by an interaction between memory and relationship closeness, $F(2, 280) = 0.80$, $p = .795$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$, 95% CI[-.001, .02].
**Mediation analysis.** The indirect effects of memory condition and importance on closeness are shown in Figure S3. In a regression framework, the relationship between the memory condition and inferred closeness corresponded to a regression coefficient of $b = 0.50$, $p = .002$, and the relationship between memory condition and inferences of subjective importance corresponded to a coefficient of $b = 1.58$, $p < .001$. Consistent with the assumption that the effects of memory condition on subjective importance led to differences in inferred closeness, predicting closeness from both memory condition and importance at the same time substantially reduced and actually reversed the relationship between memory and closeness, $b = -0.20$, $p = .201$, while the relationship between importance and closeness remained strong and significant, $b = 0.44$, $p < .001$. Formal assessment of the indirect effect of memory through perceived importance using bootstrapping (1000 resamples) estimated a coefficient of $b = 0.69$, with a 95% CI[0.52, 0.91] that did not contain zero. This analysis is consistent with evidence of memory exerting its effects on inferred closeness through inferences of subjective importance.

![Diagram](image)

*Figure S3. The indirect effect of memory on closeness through importance, Study 4.*

Unstandardized slopes are presented with standard errors in parentheses. Solid lines represent significant relationships. Memory has strong indirect effects on closeness through importance. The relationship between memory and closeness is initially strong but weakens...
to non-significance after controlling for importance. The relationships between memory and importance and between importance and closeness remain strong and significant.