In this article I propose a new theory of social life, starting from the premise that every living being should be thought of not as a blob but as a bundle of lines. I show that in joining with one another, these lifelines comprise a meshwork, in which every node is a knot. And in answering to one another, they co-respond. I propose the term correspondence to connote their affiliation, and go on to show that correspondence rests on three essential principles: of habit (rather than volition), ‘agencing’ (rather than agency) and attentionality (rather than intentionality). I explain habit as ‘doing undergoing’, agencing as a process in which the ‘I’ emerges as a question, and attention as a resonant coupling of concurrent movements. I discuss the ethical and imaginative dimensions of correspondence under the respective rubrics of care and longing. Finally I spell out the implications of a theory of correspondence for the way we approach classic themes of anthropological inquiry, including kinship and affinity, ecology and economy, ritual and religion, and politics and law. In a coda, I suggest that anthropology, too, must be a practice of correspondence.
ON HUMAN CORRESPONDENCE

Tim Ingold

tim.ingold@abdn.ac.uk

Department of Anthropology
School of Social Science
University of Aberdeen
Aberdeen AB24 3QY
Scotland, UK

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Abstract

In this article I propose a new theory of social life, starting from the premise that every living being should be thought of not as a blob but as a bundle of lines. I show that in joining with one another, these lifelines comprise a meshwork, in which every node is a knot. And in answering to one another, they co-respond. I propose the term correspondence to connote their affiliation, and go on to show that correspondence rests on three essential principles: of habit (rather than volition), ‘agencing’ (rather than agency) and attentionality (rather than intentionality). I explain habit as ‘doing undergoing’, agencing as a process in which the ‘I’ emerges as a question, and attention as a resonant coupling of concurrent movements. I discuss the ethical and imaginative dimensions of correspondence under the respective rubrics of care and longing. Finally I spell out the implications of a theory of correspondence for the way we approach classic themes of anthropological inquiry, including kinship and affinity, ecology and economy, ritual and religion, and politics and law. In a coda, I suggest that anthropology, too, must be a practice of correspondence.
Hang on!

Let me take you by the hand. It is a supremely human gesture, and in it, you and I are joined: we hold on to one another and go along together. In the linking of hands, palm meets palm while the fingers, bent to form a hook, literally interdigitate. Caught in each other’s flexion, the pull of my hand on yours, or yours on mine, only tightens the grasp. Contrary motion holds us fast. Is this, as generations of theorists have taught us, an expression of social solidarity? Hand and mind, after all, are inseparable, so when I join my hand with yours, our minds also meet. But do minds interpenetrate as fingers interdigitate? Are they also caught up, as fingers are, in the contrary forces of tension and friction? Not according to classical social theory. What is supposed to happen, rather, is that the zone of interpenetration where minds meet, where I join my conscious awareness with yours, ceases immediately to belong to either of us, and comes instead to be lodged in a superordinate presence to which we are both beholden, namely ‘society’. This, for example, was what Emile Durkheim argued, when in 1895 he first set out what he called the rules of sociological method (Durkheim 1982: 145 fn. 17). The meeting of minds, for Durkheim, brings about their fusion into a collective consciousness, of which the clasping of hands is but a ritual expression, a symbolic statement of our common commitment to society. Yet surely, the hand that clasps yours, and that you feel at the very heart of your being, is still my hand: I remain fully connected to it, in body and mind. And so it is for you as well. This was precisely the burden of one of the most celebrated texts in the early twentieth century history of the then nascent discipline of social anthropology, namely the Essay on the Gift, published in 1923-4 by Durkheim’s leading disciple, Marcel Mauss.

Though ostensibly written in homage to his mentor, Mauss in fact dealt a blow to the entire Durkheimian paradigm from which it never fully recovered. For what he succeeded in demonstrating, in this essay, was the possibility of interpenetration as a durable condition. He showed how the gift I give to you, and that is incorporated into your very being, remains fully conjoined to me. Through the gift, my awareness penetrates yours – I am with you in your thoughts – and in your counter-gift, you are with me in mine. And so long as we continue to give and receive, this interpenetration can perdure. Our lives are bound or drawn together as literally as two hands clasping. Critically, this is not an achievement of solidarity, as though lives were fused and their movement locked down. For social life, according to Mauss, is characterised not by solidity but by fluidity. And giving and receiving, wherein lives are rendered answerable to one another, is the very impulsion that keeps it flowing. In one extraordinary passage – almost entirely overlooked in the substantial critical literature that has grown up around the Essay on the Gift – Mauss declared that to witness the totality of social phenomena is to see things as the really are: ‘not merely ideas and rules, but also men and groups and their behaviours. We see them in motion as an engineer sees masses and systems, or as we observe octopuses and anemones in the sea’ (Mauss 1954: 78). This beautiful, oceanic metaphor is both profound and central to what Mauss
had to say. Real-life human beings, he insisted, inhabit a fluid medium in which every being has to find a place for itself by sending out tendrils that can bind it to others. Thus hanging on to one another, beings strive to resist the current that would otherwise sweep them asunder, but in the midst of which they are nevertheless endlessly generated. That’s what happens when I take you by the hand.

What if we were to join with Mauss and take the octopus and the anemone as exemplars for thinking about the dynamics of social life? Observe octopuses in the sea. They writhe, twist and curl; with their eight-fold brains in their tentacles, they entwine with themselves and one another to form a boundless and ever-extending tangle. When everything tangles with everything else, the result is what I call a meshwork (Ingold 2011: 63-94). To describe the meshwork is to start from the premise that every living being is a line, or better, a bundle of lines. How, then, should be describe the interpenetration of lifelines in the mesh of social life? One possible way would be to think in terms of knots (Ingold 2015: 13-16). A knot is formed when a strand such as of string or yarn is interlaced with itself or another strand and tightened. I suggest that in a world where things are continually coming into being through processes of growth and movement – that is, in a world of life – knotting is the fundamental principle of coherence. It is the way in which contrary forces of tension and friction, as in pulling tight, are generative of new forms. And it is about how these forms are held in place within such a force-field or, in short, about ‘making things stick’. The stickiness of the knot is not a thickening or coagulation that sets it off, as a thing in itself, over and against the world. For its topology is such that one can never determine what is on the inside or on the outside. Knots don’t have insides and outsides; they have interstices. Their surfaces, rather than enveloping their material mass, lie between the lines that make them up. In what way might knots and knotting, thus conceived, register in the field of human relationships?

Joining lives

The answer I propose hinges on what it means to say, of people’s lives, that they are joined. This question of the join surely lies at the very heart of our understanding of the social. And here, I think, our conventional ways of thinking have led to an impasse. Rather than being imagined as a knot, the living thing is more usually conceived as some kind of blob. In a recent contribution, for example, Maurice Bloch has adopted the word ‘blob’ as a generic term to cover what other theorists bring under such labels as ‘person’, ‘individual’, ‘self’ and ‘moi’ (Bloch 2012: 120). He even provides a series of diagrams to show how the blob might be depicted. It looks like a solid cone with a sub-conscious core at the base, rising towards a tip of consciousness, over which is suspended a halo of representations. Now in social life, as Bloch is the first to admit, these cone-like blobs do not remain resolutely outside of one another. On the contrary, they have a way of dissolving into each other’s substance, at least in part. ‘We go in and out of each other’s bodies’, as Bloch puts it (2012: 139) – and, of course, of each other’s minds as well. Blobs can collide, aggregate and meld. What they
cannot do, however, is hang on to one another, or interpenetrate. For like drops of oil on
the surface of water, whenever they meet they meld into a new blob in which their
respective essences so run together that they are no longer distinguishable, while their
surfaces dissolve in the formation of a new exterior. Or to put it in more general terms,
blobs can have no direct access to one another’s interiority save by their blending in the
constitution of compounds in which any trace of joining immediately disappears.

Suppose I have a lump of copper and a lump of tin. Copper is copper and tin is tin, and there
is no way the two lumps can bind except by forming an alloy, whereupon the relation
between them immediately becomes constitutive of a new lump, of bronze, with its own
irreducible essence. Perhaps it is the same with you and me: if we enter into a relationship,
does this not bring into existence something new that is neither you nor I, but into which we
have both yielded something of our respective selves? This was Durkheim’s argument
concerning the constitution of society in *The Rules of Sociological Method*, and in his 1901
preface to the second edition of the book he actually used the analogy of melding copper
and tin into bronze to make it (Durkheim 1982: 39). Individuals may transact with one
another through external contact, as they do in the marketplace, but society – Durkheim
insisted – is seamless. In the meshwork, by contrast, each constituent line, as it bodies forth,
lays its own trail from within the interstices of its binding with others. Thus the joining of
lives is also their continual differentiation. The knots formed in the process are not inclusive
or encompassing, not wrapped up in themselves, but always in the midst of things, while
their ends are on the loose, rooting for other lines to join with. Writing in the mid-
nineteenth century, the doyen of architectural history, Gottfried Semper, made much of the
affinity between knotting and joining, drawing attention to the apparent etymological
connection of the German words for knot (*Knoten*) and joint (*Naht*), both of which appear to
share the Indo-European root *noc* – whence come our words *nexus* and *necessity*. The
necessity of the knot, however, is not a brittle one that allows for freedom only in the
spaces left between, but a supple necessity that admits to movement as both its condition
and its consequence. It is not the necessity of predetermination, whose antonym is chance,
but a necessity born out of commitment and attention to things and to the ways they want
to go. Its antonym is negligence.

Semper was writing about knots and joints in weaving and carpentry. His knots were of
fibre, and his joints of wood. We have only to substitute persons for materials, however, to
see that the necessity of the knot or joint is also that of social life. Indeed what Semper
argued regarding the joint, in the field of material relations, closely parallels what Mauss
had to say about the gift, in the field of social relations. In the mortise and tenon, one piece
is made ready to receive the other, such that their subsequent interpenetration, hidden
away in the interiority of the joint, is an enduring condition. Just as the tenon cut in one
piece, and that is offered to the mortise cut in the other, remains fully with the first even as
it is received into the second, so the hand I offer you in greeting remains fully mine even as
you hold it in your grasp. And so it is too with the constituent lines of the meshwork. As with the latter, we might say that pieces of timber or hands that extend in welcome are joined, but not joined up. For the adverb ‘up’ connotes a finality that is belied by the ongoing life of the thing. It is no more joined up than used up. On the contrary, it carries on. In the meshwork, lines are joined not ‘up’ but ‘with’. Like the voices of choral music, whose harmony lies in their alternating tension and resolution, the entwined lines of the meshwork join with one another, and in so doing, possess an inner feel for each other and are not simply linked by external contiguity. I shall adopt the term sympathy to refer to this feel. As the design theorist Lars Spuybroek explains, sympathy is a ‘living with’ rather than a ‘looking at’, a form of feeling-knowing that operates in the interstices of things. It is, Spuybroek writes, ‘what things feel when they shape each other’ (Spuybroek 2016: xvii).

Differentiation and articulation

Spuybroek’s examples come from the art and architecture of the Gothic, with its exuberance of arboreal pillars, wreaths and fronds, rendered in such materials as stone, timber, lead and stained glass. But the human body, too, is a complex of knots and joints whose members must be in sympathy if the person is to remain alive and well. The heart (in Latin, cor) – topologically a wound-up tube, like the French horn that goes by the same name – shares with chord and chorus the root meaning of the knot. The bones, however, meet at the joints. The parallel between well-joined stone and timber in the construction of temples and well-joined limbs in the body of the warrior – the one conferring resistance against violent weather, the other resistance against the violence of enemies – was a recurrent theme in Homeric poetry. The verb ararisko, ‘to join’, commonly used for both, was one of a host of words based on the Indo-European root *ar, from which are also derived not just the warrior’s ‘arms’ and the builder’s or maker’s ‘arts’ (in Latin, armus and ars), but also ‘article’ and, of course, ‘articulate’. And these latter terms already harboured the seeds of later usage, wherein the joint came to mark a point not of sympathetic union but of attachment and separation between discrete and rigid parts, most notoriously the bones of the body, whether the animal body in a butcher’s shop or the human body in an anatomy class. The body, laid out upon the dissecting table, figures in this anatomical apprehension as a totality assembled from its parts. It appears ‘joined up’. This, however, is an apprehension divorced from life. For the living being, the joint – which, like the rest of the skeleton, was never actually assembled but has rather grown with the person to whom it belongs – is not so much an exterior connection of rigid elements as an interior condition of sympathetic union, bonded on the inside by means of a linear mesh of ligaments.

The osseous elements of the living body, the stones and timbers of temples and cathedrals, the melodic voices of the choir, the hands that offer companionship, all exemplify this principle, of what I shall call interstitial differentiation. By this I mean the way in which difference continually arises from within the midst of joining with, in the ongoing sympathy
of going along together. I want to insist, here, on a clear distinction between this principle and its opposite, of exterior articulation, as when things are joined up. That is why I am reluctant to refer to the gatherings of social life as assemblies, or as incidents of ‘assemblage’, as the word is commonly rendered through awkward translation from the French agencement. The source for this translation is most often traced to the meditations of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2004) in their sprawling compilation, A Thousand Plateaus. The difficulties of translating this work, itself an exemplification of the principle it adumbrates, are indeed formidable. It is true that some of the plethora of senses that have clustered around ‘assemblage’, as something like a bundling of life-lines reminiscent of sheaves of corn at harvest, do approximate to what I have in mind with the principle of interstitial differentiation, and I shall return to these. But others definitely do not. An example is Manuel de Landa’s (2006) appropriation of the term to denote a transitory and contingent coming together of heterogeneous components that cohere only through an exterior contact or adhesion that leaves their inner natures more or less unaffected, and that can therefore be detached and reconfigured in other arrangements without loss. Bruno Latour (2010) has advanced much the same idea in his manifesto for what he calls ‘compositionism’. The idea of composition, for Latour, ‘underlines that things have to be put together (Latin componere) while retaining their heterogeneity’. Bits and pieces that are ‘utterly heterogeneous’, as Latour admits, ‘will never make a whole, but at best a fragile, revisable and diverse composite material’ (Latour 2010: 473-4). For this reason the composition, in his terms, may indeed be as readily decomposed as composed.

This cannot be said, however, of materials joined in sympathy, or of the lives they animate. Precisely because they go along together and because their continual regeneration is nourished and impelled by the memory of their affection, they cannot be parted without a sense of loss if not grief. Something has to give from the inside; or in other words, it is necessary to forget. An articulated structure, since it remembers nothing, has nothing to forget. But the knot remembers everything. Untying the knot, therefore, is not a disarticulation or decomposition. It does not break things into pieces. It is rather a casting off, whence lines once bound together go their separate ways. Consider for example how children in the human family outgrow their parents. In anthropological parlance the relation between parent and child is known as ‘filiation’, and it is typically drawn on genealogical charts as a straight line connecting two points, representing parent and child respectively. Doubtless influenced by this genealogical depiction, Deleuze and Guattari associate filiation with the figure of the tree, which they go on to contrast with their favoured figure of the rhizome. Whereas the tree stands for filiation, the rhizome, they say, is nothing but alliance. ‘The tree imposes the verb “to be”, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, “and … and … and...”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 27). With respect, this is grossly unfair to living trees which, unlike their diagrammatic counterparts, grow, branch and swerve from within the midst of things every bit as much as do the tangling roots of the rhizome. In real life, likewise, filiation is a process of becoming in the course of which, through ‘growing older
together’ (Schutz 1962: 17), the child carries on the life of its parent while progressively differentiating its own life from that which engendered it. Indeed, filiation is not the connection of parent and child so much as the life of parent with child.

Commoning and variation

The distinction between the kinds of work done here with these little words, ‘and’ and ‘with’, is all-important. The logic of the conjunction is articulatory; that of the preposition differential. The limbs and muscles of the body, the stones and timbers of the cathedral, the voices of choral polyphony or the members of the family: these are not added to but carry on alongside one another. Limbs move, stones settle, timbers bind, voices harmonise and family members get along, through the balance of friction and tension in their affects. They are not ‘and … and … and’ but ‘with … with … with’, not additive but contrapuntal. And in answering – or responding – to one another, they co-respond. Accordingly, I propose the term correspondence to connote their affiliation. Social life, then, is not the articulation but the correspondence of its constituents. By this, I do not mean the matching of one set of elements with another by some principle of homology that leads any one element in the first set to equate with one or more elements in the second, and vice versa. That is what correspondence means in mathematics, and it has its anthropological counterpart in classical discussions of totemism according to which a relation of alliance between social groups maps onto an equivalent relation between natural species. Each group corresponds to its totem (Lévi-Strauss 1964). The sense in which I do intend the term differs from this precisely as filiation differs from alliance. It is not transverse, cutting across the duration of social life, but longitudinal, going along with it. Correspondence, in this sense, is the process by which beings or things literally answer to one another over time, for example in the exchange of letters or words in conversation, or indeed in holding hands. In what follows I aim to show that such correspondence rests on three essential principles. The first is habit, the second what I shall call ‘agencing’, and the third attentionality.

The theory of correspondence I propose here is not new. It was already adumbrated a century ago in the writings of the pragmatist philosopher and theorist of education, John Dewey. For Dewey it was axiomatic that for life to carry on, it must be lived with others. Since no living being can perpetuate itself indefinitely, or in isolation, every particular life is tasked with bringing other lives into being and with sustaining them for however long it takes for the latter, in turn, to engender further life. The continuity of the life process is therefore not individual but social. It depends, said Dewey, on communication (Dewey 1966: 4). By this he did not mean what most of us today understand by the term. In this age of digital technology, we tend to think of communication as the exchange of information. Dewey, however, was interested in how people with different experiences of life, both young and old, can attain a degree of like-mindedness that allows them to carry on their lives together. It is a matter of forging common understanding. Dewey was struck by the
etymological affinity between the words ‘communication’, ‘community’ and ‘common’, and we might follow suit by turning ‘common’ into a verb, and communication into ‘commoning’. For me to common with you does not mean my implanting into your head an idea or attribute that once belonged only to me, nor is it to regress to what we both had in our possession to begin with. It rather entails an imaginative stretch by which I attempt to cast my experience forward in ways that can join with yours, and you likewise, so that we can thenceforth travel the same path (Dewey 1966: 5-6). And this, above all, is an achievement of persons of different generations: of parents and children, or seniors and juniors, participating in each other’s lives and growing older together.

Yet critically, as Dewey went on to explain, there can be no commoning without variation – no movement, growth or life in the sharing of experience unless there is difference in what each participant brings to it (Dewey 1966: 11). And conversely, there can be no variation without commoning. For it is in joining with others that each of us comes into our own as a person with a singular and recognisable voice. Thus in essence, Dewey’s variation-in-commoning anticipates the idea, introduced above, of interstitial differentiation. And in demonstrating that commoning and variation are co-dependent, Dewey effectively proposed a theory of correspondence. He called it ‘the principle of continuity of experience’. Returning to the theme in a lecture delivered in 1938, Dewey explained the principle thus: ‘that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after’ (Dewey 2015: 35). But this principle, he argued, rests on another, still more fundamental. This is what he called the ‘principle of habit’. By this, as he was quick to point out, he did not mean what we ordinarily describe as a habit – that is, a more or less settled way of doing things that largely passes below the horizon of our attention. Nor did the principle of habit have any connection with the concept of habitus, as introduced into anthropology by Marcel Mauss and subsequently elaborated in the writings of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (Mauss 1979: 101, Bourdieu 1977). For Dewey habit was not a settlement but a movement, a life-process, in which – in the things we do – we perpetually shape the conditions under which both we and those who follow us, and to whom we relate, will live together in the future. ‘The basic character of habit’, Dewey argued, ‘is that every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences. For it is a somewhat different person who enters into them’ (Dewey 2015: 35).

Doing undergoing

The terms I particularly want to highlight here are ‘act’ and ‘undergo’. According to customary grammatical conventions, acting is something you do; undergoing is something that happens to you. One is active; the other passive. So how can you act and undergo at the same time? Why did Dewey find it necessary to conjoin the two? The conjunction, I
suggest, is critical to what he meant by habit. To explain why, let me propose – for the sake of argument – an alternative principle. I shall call it the principle of volition. According to this principle, the person is the wilful author and originator of his or her acts, which deliver on intentions that the mind places before them. If I am that person, then in the course of carrying out these acts, there are things I might have to undergo, and perhaps things that others might have to undergo as well. These are impositions I make upon myself and upon those subject to my command or who are compelled, in one way or another, to endure its effects. Both I and the others will doubtless be changed by these impositions. But the undergoing is, so to speak, bracketed within the execution. It begins here, with an intention in mind, and ends there, with the intention fulfilled in the world. Comparing the end with the beginning, we can see that change has occurred. I could do the same thing again, but I will not be quite the same person doing it. Now at first glance, this is entirely in accord with what Dewey says in the passage to which I have just referred. In fact, however, he is saying quite the opposite. For the one who acts is not sovereign. This is because what he does is not action as such but experience, and to enact an experience – in anything but a banal, dramaturgical sense – is to be always already inside it. The experience is something one undergoes, and yet this undergoing is active and not passive; it is something one does.

To enact experience, in short, is to ‘do undergoing’. And what it brings about is not change, imposed from without, but transformation from within. The acting is inside the undergoing, and not vice versa. Otherwise put, we dwell in habit. And dwelling in habit, as I shall show, is fundamentally attentional. Suppose for example that I intend to go for a walk. I pack my bags, prepare provisions, plan the route. All this conforms to the principle of volition. But once on my way, it all seems very different. Walking ceases to be something I set my body to do, as a self-imposed routine. Rather, it seems that I become my walking, and that my walking walks me. I am there, inside of it, animated by its rhythm. And with every step I am not so much changed as modified, in the sense not of transition from one state to another but of perpetual renewal. I am indeed a different person when I arrive; not the same person in another place, or with a body marked by the stigmata of passage. The phenomenologist James Hatley, reflecting on the walking practice of artist Hamish Fulton, observes that ‘walking, as Fulton practices it, is not the making of an experience in the sense that I own it, that I have an experience of the world, but in the sense that I undergo it, am traumatized by it ... the body undergoes rather than masters the earth it walks’ (Hatley 2003: 204-5). Even aches and blisters unfold in my experience, as part of a life actively undergone, and may be all the more painful for that: like it or not, I cannot detach them from the walking being that I am. They are biographical, and I can tell a story from them. Nor, once on my way, can I sustain the idea that walking is mindless, a bodily automatism that frees the intellect for unencumbered thought. On the contrary, walking is itself a habit of thinking.

This thinking is not however an inside-the-head, cognitive operation but the work of a mind that, in its deliberations, freely mingles with the body and the world (see Clark 1997: 53). Or
to put it another way, I do not so much think *while* walking as think *in* walking. This thinking is a way of taking in the world, so that it becomes less the topic than the medium of my meditation. Perhaps the meditative power of walking lies in precisely this: that it gives thought room to breathe, to let the world in on its reflections. But by the same token, to be open to the world we must also surrender something of our agency. As Hatley (2003: 204) puts it, ‘the mind’s grip upon the world is revealed in walking to be the world’s grip upon the mind’. Even as I walk, I must adjust my footing to the terrain, follow the path, submit to the elements. There is, in every step, an element of hesitation, of uncertainty. And this, I suppose, is what it means to *inhabit* the practice of walking. It is to put the ‘I’ who acts not in front but in the midst of the experience undergone. And being in the midst, it is continually rediscovering itself. It is no longer possible to say, in confidence, ‘I do this’ or ‘I did that’. One has rather to ask, ‘is this what I am doing?’ or ‘did I do that?’ It is as if the action were ever calling for my agency in its wake, not as an answer but as a question. ‘’I am’’, as artist and philosopher Erin Manning (2016: 37) puts it, ‘is always, to a large degree, “was that me?”’ Such is the ‘I’ of habit, in which agency arises *a posteriori* as a query rather than being posited in advance as an efficient cause. As a query it calls on others to respond, and in so doing to put their own agency on the line.

**Agencing**

Just because not everything happens according to one’s own volition does not however mean that someone else is in charge, or that agency is more widely distributed. It means, rather, that there must be something wrong with an account of action which presumes that whatever happens to us is an effect of some agency or other. Is there any way, Manning asks (2016: 120), to imagine *not* being the masters of our acts ‘without falling prey to the idea that if we are not master, someone or something else must be?’ Could the answer perhaps lie in the principle of habit? If agency is not given in advance of action, as cause to effect, but is rather ever forming and transforming from within the action itself – if it is always in question rather than presupposed as an answer – then perhaps we should play the same trick with ‘agency’ that we have already played with ‘common’, and turn the noun into the gerund of a verb. In French this comes out as *agencement*, a word that nevertheless carries a double connotation: of fitting together or assembly as well as of the transformative potential of ‘doing undergoing’. It is for this reason, as we have already seen, that its translation as ‘assemblage’ has sowed so much confusion. Manning chooses to retain the French term rather than attempt a translation, and to use it specifically in the latter sense, as ‘potentializing directionality’ rather than ‘existent configuration’. It is a term, she says, that ‘speaks to the interstitial arena of experience of the interval’ (2016: 123). By the interval she means what I shall introduce below as the ‘midstream’, and by the experience of the interval she is referring precisely to what I have called interstitial differentiation. Manning’s argument is, indeed, one with which I fully concur, but in order to avoid the ambiguities of *agencement* I shall translate the specific meaning she has in mind as
‘agencing’. It is, admittedly, an ugly word, but as a shorthand for the potential of undergoing to transform the doer, I can think of nothing better.

In the correspondence of agencing, then, there are no volitional subjects, no ‘I’s or ‘you’s to place before any action. That is why it is so hard for us to find the words to express it. ‘We are inclined’, writes phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels (2003: 27), ‘to assume all too quickly that wherever there is a deed there must be a doer too. But are we ... really dealing with a deed as the grammatical form of active verbs suggests?’ According to the grammatical categories with which we are familiar today, the active voice of the verb is opposed to the passive as ‘action done’ to ‘action undergone’. We therefore have great difficulty in expressing the action of doing undergoing. Yet as linguist Emile Benveniste (1971) demonstrated in a classic study, the active/passive opposition is neither ancient nor universal. Plenty of non-Indo-European languages do not have it, and even within the Indo-European fold it has emerged historically from a decomposition of what ancient Greek grammarians called the ‘middle voice’. It was this decomposition that put agency, as it were, out in front, separating the doer from the deed. In the middle voice, by contrast, the agent is inside the process of his or her action, inside the verb, not separate from it. The doer, as Benveniste puts it (1971: 149), ‘achieves something which is being achieved in him’. This is what happens, for example, when I walk, and when my walking walks me. In walking, I become a line (Ingold 2007: 75). It happens, too, when I draw, ‘taking my line for a walk’, in the memorable aphorism of artist Paul Klee (1961: 105). And it happens when I sing. The line of becoming walks or sings, neither in the active voice nor in the passive, but in the voice of the middle. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 323), such a line ‘is always in the middle: one can only get it by the middle. A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two, it is the in-between’.

In his reflections on upbringing in The Troubadour of Knowledge, Michel Serres (1997: 4-6) compares this experience of the in-between to that of the swimmer, breasting the current of a swift river. Here in the midstream, you enter a world unknown to those left standing on the banks. It is one in which, after a while, there is no longer any right bank or left bank, where you cease to be between this and that, where you have become a hyphen, a denizen of the in-between. Immersed like the octopus in a fluid medium, always at risk of going under, you have no option but to keep on going, in a direction orthogonal to that of the line connecting the banks on either side. ‘The real passage’, as Serres declares (1997: 5), ‘occurs in the middle’. This goes to the heart of the distinction I want to draw between correspondence and interaction. Interaction goes back and forth as agents, facing each other on opposite banks of the river, trade messages, missiles and merchandise. But to correspond, in my terms, is to join with the swimmer in the midstream. It is a matter not of taking sides but of going along. Thus where interaction is transverse, correspondence is longitudinal. The former is bounded by ends, set in advance by each party. These ends are commonly known as interests, from the Latin inter (between) and esse (to be): literally, in
the words of Hannah Arendt (1958: 182), that ‘which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together’. The prosecution of interests, in interaction, is like an oscillation between two points. But correspondence is not a connection of points but a binding of lines. It is not interactive but multilinear. And these lines, as we have seen, join not at the ends but in the middle. Ends are not given in advance but emerge in the action itself, and are recognisable as such only in acknowledging the possibility of new beginnings. Here, beginnings produce endings, and are produced by them. Every end is not a terminal but a moment along the way. Thus for the interaction of subjects, or intersubjectivity, I substitute the correspondences of the middle voice, and for the network of connected points, the meshwork of knotted and entangled lines.

**Attentionality**

I have already explained the difference between the principles of volition and habit, and between agency and agencing. The next and final step in my argument is to elucidate the distinction between intention and attention. Let me return to my example of going for a walk. There are things I have to attend to, both in preparation and during the walk itself. Before setting out I check that I have everything I need: map, compass, rations, and so on. En route, I check that features of the visible landscape match what is marked on the map, allowing me to confirm my topographical position. And where there are potential hazards, I check that I have the right manoeuvre to circumvent them. This kind of attention is about matching up the contents of the mind with objects in the world, and establishing a one-to-one correlation between each mental representation and each physical feature. It is the way the mind has of checking up on the world, and it periodically interrupts movement in order to take stock. Sometimes, the body will not obey the mind’s command to stop: as hands that shake when looking through binoculars or taking a photo, or feet that rock when admiring a view. Thus on a visit to the Hebridean island of Ulinish, in the company of his biographer James Boswell, Samuel Johnson complained that his appreciation of a natural arch in the rock would have been greater ‘had not the stones, which incumbered our feet, given us leisure to consider it’ (Johnson and Boswell 1924: 67). Here the jolting and jarring, caused by the body’s engagement with uneven terrain, upsets the stability of focused mental attention. We commonly register this upset as distraction. As the theatre scholar George Home-Cook (2015: 39) has observed, attention in this sense of check-up sets up distraction as its opposite, characterised by ‘a loss of attention and the usurpation of the mind by the body’. The mind attends, the body distracts.

This is the form of attention when our fundamental way of being in the world is understood to be intentional. It is accordingly framed by the principle of volition. But if going for a walk is volitional, walking itself is habitual. Here, the relation between intention and attention is the other way about. Walking calls for the pedestrian’s continual responsiveness to the terrain, the path and the elements. To respond, he must attend to these things as he goes.
along, joining or participating with them in his own movements. This is what it means to listen, watch and feel. If attention, in going for a walk, interrupts or cuts across movement so as to establish a transverse relation between mind and world (the separation of which is assumed from the outset), in walking it is an animate movement in itself. The key quality that makes a movement attentional lies in its resonance with the movements of the things to which it attends – in its going along with them. Attention, in this sense, is longitudinal. The attentive walker tunes his movement to the terrain as it unfolds around him and beneath his feet, rather than having to stop at intervals to check up on it. Distraction, then, is not the opposite of attention, nor does it set body and mind at cross-purposes. It is rather what happens when attention itself pulls in different directions, leaving the walker in a bind and causing awareness to stall. Our attention can, as we say, be caught or captivated, pulled in one direction or another, or sometimes in several directions at once. As Manning puts it (2016: 154), attention in this sense is not consciously directed by a subject, as if shining a spotlight on the world, but is rather emergent in the event, ‘activated by the force of the directionality the event calls forth’. Far from taking up a fixed position or standpoint, whence one can check up on what is there, attention continually pulls the walker out of it. It is, in this sense, a practice of exposure. It forsakes the security of the fragile centre that we may have drawn around ourselves for an uncertain future. ‘One ventures from home’, as Deleuze and Guattari put it (2004: 344), ‘on the thread of a tune’.

It is worth remembering that the verb attendre, in French, means ‘to wait’, and that even in English, to attend to things or persons carries connotations of looking after them, abiding with them and following what they do (Masschelein 2010: 282). That is to say, it is a practice of care. My contention is that the principle of habit, as in walking – as opposed to the principle of volition, as in going for a walk – accords ontological priority to attentionality as the fundamental mode of being in the world, whereas intentions are but milestones thrown up along the way, more often than not revealed in hindsight when, looking back on ground already covered, we reconstruct it as a series of predetermined stages. Or to put it in a nutshell, if the principle of volition renders a form of attention founded in intentionality, the principle of habit gives us a form of intention founded in attentionality. This is the attentionality of going along with things, opening up to them and doing their bidding. I do not to deny that a mind is at work in the attentionality of walking, just as it is in the intentionality of going for a walk. But this is not a mind confined to the head and set over against the world; it is rather one that extends along the sensory pathways of the pedestrian’s participation in the environment. The awareness of such a mind is not transitive but intransitive, not of but with. Where ‘of-ness’ makes the other to which one attends into its object, and ticks it off, ‘with-ness’ saves the other from objectification by bringing it alongside as an accomplice. It turns othering into togethering, interaction into correspondence. To start with the principle of habit, rather than that of volition, is to acknowledge that awareness is always awareness with before it is ever awareness of. We
can recognise a movement, and respond to it, before we ever fix it in our sights. The operations of the attentional mind, in short, are not cognitive but ecological.

**Care and longing**

Mainstream accounts of social life have long been framed by what Manning (2016: 6) calls the ‘volition-agency-intentionality’ triad. Of these three terms, each implies the other. I have sought to establish an alternative triad, the terms of which are equally bound by mutual implication. These are habit, agencing and attentionality. My claim, in short, is that correspondence is the way of relating of a being that dwells in habit, whose agency is ever-emergent and whose stance is attentional. Indeed the title of a recent contribution by Waldenfels (2003), ‘From Intentionality to Responsivity’, says it all. Before concluding, I would like to address two further corollaries of this claim. One is ethical; the other is about longing, and has to do with memory and imagination.

The ethical implication returns us to the practice of care. We care for people and things, of course, by giving them our full attention and by answering to their needs. ‘The human being’, writes Waldenfels (2003: 32), ‘is an animal which responds’; and this responsiveness, adds philosophical anthropologist Thomas Schwarz Wentzer (2014: 42), ‘precedes responsibility; it is the existential condition to the answer that I am’. As responsive beings, the responsibility of care is something that falls to us. The actions we carry out in its fulfilment are therefore in the nature of tasks. A task is an action that we owe rather than own. It is as much undergone as done – it is a ‘doing undergoing’ – which comes to us because we are people of habit. It is not done of our own free will, but nor is it obligatory in the sense that it is imposed upon us by some higher order of society to which we are accountable. Rather, it is done because in a community bound by emergent difference rather than prior similarity – ‘a community of those who have nothing in common’, as theorist of education Gert Biesta (2006) describes it – the presence of others who are necessarily strange to us demands a response. In such a community, Biesta writes ‘what is done, what needs to be done, and what only I can do, is to respond to the stranger, to be responsive and responsible to what the stranger asks from me’ (2006: 64-5, original emphases). We are required to speak, in short, in a language of responsivity and responsibility. There cannot be one without the other: to be answerable, one has to be able to answer. And to be able to answer, one has to be present. In the language of commoning and variation, in which each person speaks with his or her unique and singular voice rather than as a representative of the collectivity, what matters is not so much the words we use as that we should respond with them. For it is by way of our words, and the voices with which we utter them, that we make ourselves present to others as the particular persons we are (Ingold 2005: 171).

To care for others, we must allow them into our presence so that we, in turn, can be present to them. In an important sense, we must let them be, so that they can speak to us. However
letting be, in this sense, is not easily reconciled with understanding, let alone with explanation. Understanding and explanation belong to that other mode of attention, as check-up. In this mode, we attend to things and persons so that we can account for them. Once accounted for, they can be ticked off, removed from our list and dispatched to that repository of the ‘already known’ or ‘well understood’, the contents of which no longer demand anything of us. And this, so often, is how we encounter them, not least in the citadels of academia. How often have we heard it said, by learned and compassionate humanists, that understanding depends on embedding things in their contexts, whether social, cultural or historical? It is like putting them to sleep. To the rebellious child, who refuses to lie down and go to sleep and keeps leaping out of bed, do we issue the command: ‘get back into your proper context and be understood?’ Truly, what the child wants, and indeed demands, is attention. He or she has things to say, to tell us or to show us, and cries out to be noticed. And we should watch or listen. That is what it means to care. Not only, however, does care entail listening to what others have to tell us; it also demands that we respond in kind. It is a matter of discharging an ontological debt, of giving back to the world and its inhabitants what we owe them for our own formation. That which we owe is, in the original sense of the term, a duty. That is why the responsibility of care is not only practical (there are tasks to be undertaken) but dutiful (it discharges a debt). It follows that correspondence is not done out of volition, nor under obligation, but as the discharge of duty.

What have care and attention, then, to do with longing? The answer lies in the way longing brings together the activities of remembering and imagining. Both are ways of presencing: remembering presences the past; imagining presences the future. By remembering, here, I do not mean making the past into an object of memory. That would be tantamount to separating the past from the present, as if it were complete, over and done with, and available for transmission as heritable property. This is what happens when we put the past in its context. The entire context, then, along with everything embedded in it, becomes part of the package. In remembering, to the contrary, the past is not finished but active in the present. Even if people who have passed away can be remembered only by their stories, every telling is not just about the person told: in a real sense it is the person, with their unique voice and character, brought into the here and now so that the living can carry on their correspondence with them. Storytelling in this sense is a prolongation of the life-line, not a way of wrapping it up. And ‘prolonging the line’ is just an expansion of longing. So it is too with imagining. For if remembering does not make the past into an object, then nor does imagining make an object of the future. That is to say, to imagine is not to project the future, as a state of affairs distinct from the present. It is rather to catch a life that, in its hopes and dreams, has a way of running ahead of its moorings in the material world. Where it runs is beyond the horizon of our conceptualisation. At this horizon, future and past are no longer distinguishable. They merge at the ends of longing, in a place where all imagining
is remembering, and all remembering imagining. It is a place we perpetually dream of and strive for, but never reach.

**Back to anthropology**

In this essay, I have advanced a theory of correspondence. In so doing, I might seem to have drifted rather far from the traditional concerns of anthropology. To counter this impression, and to bring the argument full circle, let me conclude by putting forward some speculations on the anthropological potential of the idea of correspondence in the traditional disciplinary subfields of kinship and affinity, ecology and economy, ritual and religion, politics and law.

We are accustomed to speaking of the ‘lines’ of kinship, and to drawing these lines in genealogical diagrams. As already noted in the case of filiation, it is also usual in such diagrams to depict them as linking persons point to point. Kinship is made to look as though its lines connect. Correspondence thinking, however, acknowledges what the people among whom we work already know, namely, that the lines are living persons. Kinship is not so much a connection between points as a meeting of lines; therefore there are no lines of kinship as such, only correspondences. The life-historic lines which correspond in kinship are, by the same token, lines of affect or sentiment, whose rooting for one another rests upon what Meyer Fortes famously called ‘the axiom of amity’. For Fortes, ‘kinship is equated with amity, and non-kinship with its negation’ (1969: 110, see also 219-49). For what do kinspersons do? They attend to one another, in the sense of abiding with, caring for and doing each other’s bidding on which I have already elaborated. As a commitment to a life undergone with others, kinship holds in abeyance those particular and determinate interests that lie between others and the self. The imperatives of kinship, in short, lie in the prolongation of the line, and in the responsiveness and responsibilities this entails. Indeed we could go so far as to define kinship as a correspondent process of doing-undergoing whose constitutive lines, far from articulating end-to-end, join in the middle, in the midst of things. It is in precisely this respect, as we have seen, that kinship differs from affinity. They are based, respectively, on the principles of habit and volition. The correspondences of kinship are observed unconditionally, wherever they may lead, but affinity offers strategy and choice. Accordingly, kinship is longitudinal, affinity transverse; one is ‘with’, the other ‘and’. In kinship, life brings about new life, and growth new growth, as beginnings produce endings and endings beginnings. But in affinity there are only ends. Affinity negotiates in the intermediacy of interests, but kinship answers to life itself, along its many lines. Affinity is between, kinship in-between.

Turning to ecology and economy, both terms share a common root in the Greek word for ‘house’ (οίκος). Economy is house-holding; in ecology – as originally defined by the zoologist Ernst Haeckel in 1866 – nature herself becomes a household in the continuation of which each and every organism plays its part. But what could a household be in a world of living lines? Certainly not the potato in a sack so commonly invoked in studies of tribal and
peasant societies organised by the so-called ‘domestic mode of production’ (Sahlins 1972: 95). It is not a blob. It would be more analogous to a knot from which lines fan out, tangling with the lines of all the other living things which, in their habitation of the earth, deposit their own trails in the form of roots and runners, paths and tracks. To make a living, farmers and woodsmen must join with the ways of plants, hunters and herdsmen with the ways of animals, artisans with the ways of their materials. Production, in such an ecology of correspondence, is about attending to the trajectories of these non-human lives. Writing of the labour process in the pages of *Capital*, Karl Marx insisted that the producer’s ‘purposive will, manifesting itself as attention, must be operative throughout’ (Marx 1930: 170, my emphasis). Note this well: the mark of production lies not in the masterful imposition of prior intentions, already settled in the imagination, upon the materials of nature, as implied in the classic definition of man as *homo faber*, nor do these materials submit passively to what, in the name of human ends, is done to them. On the contrary, as much as kinship is about attending to persons, economy is about attending to active materials. In this, as Marx and Engels had earlier insisted, humans are the producers, not just of objects to consume, but of their ‘actual material life’ (Marx and Engels 1977: 42). They too are transformed in the process; what they achieve is achieved in them. To produce, in short, is actively to undergo, in the middle voice. And just as undergoing always overflows doing, so the production of life always exceeds the finalities of consumption.

Like kinship and economy, religion, too, is fundamentally a joining or entwining of lines. Though the etymology of the term is disputed, at least one interpretation has it as a compound of *re* (again) and *ligare* (to bind or fasten). Religion is thus re-binding, and lines and knotting seem to be at the heart of it. Yet classically, discussions of religion have been waylaid by questions of belief and the supernatural. This is to think of the religious imagination as a power of representation, of giving form to appearances or dressing a world already in place with images of the divine. I have argued, to the contrary, that imagination is not about representing things but about a longing for that which lies beyond the reach of conceptualisation: it is the impulse of a life that, in continually running ahead of itself or leading by submission, bodies forth as a question that does not already contain its answer. And this perhaps gives us a better way of understanding religious sensibility as a matter not of belief but of *faith*. Religious faith, as theologian Peter Candler puts it, is founded in a grammar of participation, not of representation (Candler 2006: 30-40; see also Ingold 2013: 746). It has nothing to do with holding beliefs about or concepts of the world and everything to do with corresponding with it. It is about commitment and the passion that infuses it, about the recognition of what we owe to the world for our existence and our capacity to act. The combination of attentionality, habit and doing-undergoing that, as I have shown, is of the essence of correspondence is perfectly captured in the concept of religious ‘observance’. What is failure to observe? It is to deny the necessity of the knot — a necessity, it will be recalled, that lies not in mechanical determination but in an attention to things in their ongoing differentiation. Denial, here, is tantamount to negligence. ‘Whoever has no
religion’, as Serres (1995: 48) astutely notes, ‘should not be called an atheist or an unbeliever, but negligent’.

Correspondence has a political dimension too. For the combination of commoning and variation on which it rests points the way to a politics of difference rather than identity, in which the political community is defined not by the priority of common interests, set in advance, but by the commitment to getting along together. This is the politics of what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten (2013) – the one a theorist of education, the other a literary scholar – call the ‘undercommons’. The form of feeling in the undercommons, they say, is ‘not collective, not given to decision, not adhering or reattaching to settlement, nation, state, territory or historical story’. It is rather ‘a way of feeling through others, a feel for feeling others feeling you’ (2013: 98). Harney and Moten call it ‘hapticality’; I have called it sympathy. It is interior sentiment rather than exterior contact, correspondent rather than interactive, which irrupts into the modern constitution as through a fissure, exploding the tidy opposition between the citizen and the state. It is anathema to both. Citizens cannot stand it, because it shatters the illusion that they are each free to act of their own volition. No state can condone it, since it disrupts collective sovereignty. Correspondence impels differentiation; but in the eyes of the state, difference can only be expressed in the language of homogeneity, as though the differentiation were already completed, constraining the members of this or that sub-culture, indigenous minority or ethnic group to speak with one voice. This is to reduce feeling through others to a marked identity, to revert from the imaginative stretch of commoning to the expression of received characteristics that individuals possess in common from the start. It is, as political theorist William Connolly (1995: xx) observes, to sacrifice the essentially relational character of difference for ‘the bland idea of diversity among independent entities’. Ironically, however, the state’s rule of law depends on the correspondences of the undercommons, even as it is threatened by them. For without the affect generated through the inner feeling-for-one-another or sympathy of correspondent lives, no system of regulation could function. Bereft of affect, how could any judgement, albeit justified in cold logic, carry practical or motivational force? Ultimately, then, as responsibility rests on responsiveness, obligation on duty, any system of law and ethics must be founded on the correspondences of the in-between.

Coda

Finally, what of anthropology itself? If ever there was a way of variation-in-commoning, of doing undergoing, then surely it would be the anthropological practice of participant observation. Like people everywhere and at all times, anthropologists are both observers and participants. There is no contradiction here. It is important to refute, once and for all, the commonplace fallacy that observation is a practice exclusively dedicated to the objectification of the beings and things that command our attention and their removal from the sphere of our correspondence with consociates. The source of the problem lies in that
little word of. As already noted, ‘of-ness’ makes an object of that to which one attends, whereas ‘with-ness’ brings it alongside as a fellow-traveller. Whenever we invoke the anthropology of this or that, it is as though we run rings around the thing in question, turning the paths along which we observe into circumscribed topics of inquiry. It is this ‘of’ that converts observation into objectification. But to observe with is not to objectify; it is to attend to persons and things, to learn from them, and to follow in precept and practice. Whereas of-ness is intentional, with-ness is attentional. An anthropology founded in the principle of habit, of doing undergoing, is always with before it is of. Herein, I contend, lies the purpose, dynamic and potential of our discipline. It is to join with others in an ongoing, speculative and experimental exploration of what the possibilities and potentials of life might be. But it is not, by the same token, about putting things behind us by embedding them in their contexts. It is not about understanding or interpretation. That’s a task for ethnography.\textsuperscript{10} To practice anthropology, to the contrary, is to restore the world to presence, to attend, and to respond. It is to move forward in real time, not to stop the clock in order to look back. Our responsibilities, therefore, are to the future: what we seek are ways to answer to the world. And in this, anthropology is – indeed must be – a practice of correspondence.

NOTE

This article is not, but not not, based on the Royal Anthropological Institute Huxley Memorial Lecture for 2014. When I accepted the invitation to present the lecture, I was beginning work on a book that was eventually published under the title \textit{The Life of Lines} (Ingold 2015). My plan was first to finish the book, and then to use the lecture as a springboard to develop certain of its themes beyond what the scope of the book would afford. But as ever, writing \textit{The Life of Lines} took longer than expected, and when the time came to prepare the lecture I had only just managed to send the completed manuscript to the publisher. Being still so close to the book, I was unable to do much more in the lecture than summarise those themes that I saw as offering potential for further work. For this reason, I did not submit the text of the lecture, as presented, for publication. I decided instead to allow sufficient time to elapse for my ideas to move on, and then to return to it. Almost two years have passed since then, and the result is now before you. For the most part it is new, but inevitably there remains some residual overlap with the book. The original lecture can be viewed at \url{www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vlq5s04wBU}. I would like to thank the Director and Council of the Royal Anthropological Institute for the invitation to present it, and British Museum’s Clore Centre for hosting it.
References


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In the original French, the passage reads as follows: ‘Dans les sociétés, on saisit plus que des idées ou des règles, on saisit des hommes, des groupes et leurs comportements. On les voit se mouvoir comme en mécanique on voit des masses et des systèmes, ou comme dans la mer nous voyons des pieuvres et des anémones’ (Mauss 1923-4: 181-2).

Here I have drawn on the authoritative review of Semper’s work by Kenneth Frampton (1995: 86).

On this parallel, see Giannisi (2012), and for its etymological correlates see Nagy (1996).

I myself have come late to Dewey’s work, and have been astonished by its prescience, anticipating much that is at stake in contemporary anthropology. Bearing in mind Dewey’s prominence as a public intellectual in the early decades of the twentieth century, the almost complete absence of any reference to his work in the history of anthropological ideas is puzzling.

The crucial point, as Gert Biesta observes in commenting on Dewey’s text, is that common understanding is not a condition for participation: ‘It is not that we first need to come to a common understanding and only then begin to coordinate our actions. For Dewey it is precisely the other way around: common understanding is produced by, is the outcome of successful cooperation in action’ (Biesta 2013: 30).

This is why I prefer ‘correspondence’ to the notion of ‘agential intra-action’, proposed by Karen Barad. Admittedly, agency for Barad ‘is an enactment, not something that someone or something has’ (2003: 826-7), and in focusing on the way enactment arises from within it seems as though Barad’s purpose with ‘intra-action’ is much the same as mine with ‘correspondence’. The difference however lies in the direction of travel. The trouble with ‘intra-action’, for me, is that it precisely reverses the between of ‘inter-action’, turning it outside in, whereas with ‘midstreaming’ I aim for a 90 degree rotation.

Note that the contrast between these senses of attention, respectively transverse and longitudinal, as stationary check-up and resonant movement, maps precisely onto that between the two senses of correspondence outlined above, as the one-to-one matching of concepts in the mind to objects in the world, and the answering of lifelines to one another over time.

The thing about walking, argues philosopher of education Jan Masschelein, is that ‘it allows for a view beyond every perspective since a perspective is bound to a standpoint in the sense of a subjective position, which is exactly also the position of a subject in relation to an object or objective. Walking is about putting this position at stake; it is about ex-position, being out-of-position’ (Masschelein 2010: 278). That is what Masschelein means by exposure.

I have described this way of remembering and its implications for hunting and gathering societies in Ingold (2005: 171-2). See also Ingold (2007: 15; 2011: 156-64).
I have discussed the distinction between anthropology and ethnography at greater length elsewhere (Ingold 2011: 229-143; 2014).