Implementing the Global Strategy Where It Matters Most: The EU’s Credibility Deficit and the European Neighbourhood

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The EU Global Strategy is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographic scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS, so there is still scope for more clarity regarding the EU’s core strategic aims. This article argues that in addition to fostering internal cohesion, the EU's strategic priority must involve stabilising its own neighbourhood. This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit regarding the EU's own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this problem as effectively as it could have. Therefore much more work will need to be done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the EUGS and related policy statements.

Keywords: EU, global strategy, CFSP, CSDP, security policy, European Neighbourhood Policy

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Since the early 1970s, the European integration process has involved periodic strategising about the priorities for external policy cooperation. These efforts, beginning with the Document on the European Identity (December 1973), are remarkably consistent in terms of core thematic goals (democracy, human rights, peace/security, multilateralism, the UN system, and the rule of law) and geographic priorities (Europe's eastern flank and the Middle East/North Africa, or MENA, including the Mediterranean). In recent years these priorities have been reflected in more specific strategies, whether involving 'functional' goals, such as the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the 2008 review of the ESS, the 2013 EU Cyber-security Strategy (CSS), and the 2014 Maritime Security Strategy (MSS), or geographic/regional objectives, such as various EU Common Strategies, the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Central Asian Strategy, the 2011 Sahel Strategy, and the 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (among others). Finally, the EU has also managed, since 2003, to deploy its own military or hard power resources along with its traditional civilian or soft power resources such as diplomacy, trade, and development/humanitarian aid. However, while this track record may appear impressive, the EU has fallen short in terms of implementing many of its external strategic goals, a tendency still often summarised in terms of a 'capability-expectations gap'.

This article argues that such a gap is likely to persist in light of the latest effort along these lines: the EU Global Strategy (hereafter 'EUGS'). One problem is that the EUGS offers a very limited diagnosis of the EU's inherent shortcomings in terms of defining and achieving its strategic goals, especially considering the inadequate impact of the last major effort to reform the EU's institutional machinery (the 2009 Lisbon Treaty). The fact that the EUGS was not revised at all to take into account the
consequences of Britain's vote to leave the EU lends additional support to this assessment. A second problem involves the EU's likely credibility in pursuing its core strategic aims, which depends upon not just an accounting of the EU's currently available soft and hard power resources, but also a realistic evaluation of the EU's recent track record in deploying those resources to manage many of the problems stressed in the EUGS. Thus, as the EU itself asserts that 'A dose of nuanced realism is required' about what the EU can achieve, the rest of this article will examine these two problems in order to assess the extent to which the EU is likely to implement most of the central ambitions of the EUGS. It draws upon several recent studies conducted by the author and others regarding the EU's efforts as an international security actor, particularly since the advent of the Lisbon Treaty.

As space considerations prevent a detailed examination of the entire EUGS, my argument is subject to three important caveats. First, as defence is covered elsewhere, I shall focus primarily on security. This focus is also justified, I believe, because neither the EUGS nor the EU's track record on defence suggest that the EU will ever play a strategically important role in this realm, relative to NATO (as the EUGS affirms) and individual EU member states, which are still split on defence policy despite some recent suggestions of greater defence cooperation in the aftermath of Brexit. Second, and following from the previous point, the EU is not likely to become a very credible global actor in areas outside of economic/trade/regulatory affairs. This is true especially regarding major challenges or adversaries like China as well as key partners/competitors like the US and India. Thanks in part to its extremely limited capacity for military power projection, the EU will play only a supporting role at best beyond Europe and its near abroad, and mainly when the US and the EU can agree on strategic priorities (such as overseeing Iran's
nuclear programme). Third, I believe the EU's strategic priority must be to preserve its internal unity (which includes the EUGS goals of 'security' and 'prosperity') and stabilise its border regions. These problems are directly linked, and this dual challenge, which should be the main concern of the EUGS, is also the central concern of this article. Therefore I will focus primarily on where the EUGS matters the most: security in the EU's 'neighbourhood.' In other words, to what extent can the EU make credible commitments to protect and advance its core strategic interests in this realm, as outlined in the EUGS?

I. The EUGS: An overview

The EUGS is an impressive achievement; it is also an ambitious document, not least because it covers not just EU security/defence policy but foreign policy more generally. In fact, at around 15,000 words, the EUGS is nearly four times as long as the 2003 ESS (just over 4,000 words). The 2003 ESS mainly identified five 'key threats' to the EU: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organised crime, regional conflict, and state failure. In 2008, a review process added two new problems - energy security and climate change - while also mentioning cyber-security. Taken together, these documents list eight specific threats that could be addressed by various EU policy tools; some of these problems are discussed in more detail in the 2013 CSS and the 2014 MSS, among other statements.

Conversely, the EUGS broadens EU strategic thinking in several ways, first of all by noting some general values/interests/principles to guide EU action. However, most of these ideas have appeared in previous documents and/or EU treaties as noted above. The real core of the EUGS, then, involves five strategic priorities as follows:

* Security and defence (including a deterrence capability)
* Enhancing 'state and societal resilience to our East and South'
* An 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crises
* Promoting 'cooperative regional orders'
* Enhancing 'global governance for the 21st century'

I shall return to these priorities below; for the moment it should be noted that despite the differences in approach noted above between the ESS and the EUGS (especially the new focus on 'resilience' relative to democracy and human rights), there is one central idea that links them both: the ESS mentions the need to develop a European strategic culture 'that fosters early, rapid, and where necessary, robust intervention,' while the EUGS mentions the goals of strategic autonomy and responsiveness. In other words, 'EU strategy' is not just about taking action; it is about the EU's (potential) freedom to choose among various courses of action, particularly during a crisis, rather than have difficult decisions forced upon it. This also involves being proactive rather than reactive, and then being effective and credible when EU action is taken; these goals have eluded the EU in many ways.

To help address this problem, the EU produced a shorter document, the EUGS Review, exactly one year prior to the release of the EUGS, in June 2015. This analysis, which solicited input from various specialists, summarised the EU's major capabilities that could be used to implement the EUGS: the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), development/humanitarian aid, trade policy, sanctions, the Energy Security Strategy, a revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and enlargement (among others). In addition, the EUGS Review also gave a brief diagnosis of areas where the EU had fallen short in its foreign/security/defence policy. These include:
* A lack of policy direction (particularly with the CFSP/CSDP and with the EU’s ‘strategic partnerships’);

* A lack of flexibility (for example, development/humanitarian aid and counter-terrorism);

* A lack of EU ‘leverage’ considering the EU’s trade power and the limited impact of the ENP;

* The ‘coordination problem’, which involves a range of dimensions in order to have ‘multiple voices’ speaking in unison for the EU rather than a ‘single voice’; and

* The ‘capability problem’, which mentions issues such as migration and various difficulties regarding CSDP deployments.

This diagnosis is essentially correct, and has been confirmed by other EU bodies\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{xix}} and external reviews,\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{xx}} yet it still falls short in terms of informing what appeared later in the EUGS regarding how to implement the new strategy. Overall, then, the EUGS is very heavy on generalities and very light on communicating a real sense of urgency about priorities and, especially, leadership by one or more EU member states.\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{xxi}} In fact, EU member states themselves can be a major impediment to implementation, yet the EUGS does not address this problem, while EU member states are not willing to delegate more authority over foreign/security policy to EU institutions. There is also little political will across the EU for another major reform like the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty. As the EUGS reaffirms ‘peer pressure’ to maintain cohesion in an intergovernmental system, rather than punishing defections with fines or court rulings, the EU will continue to be hobbled by lowest-common-denominator decisions, or worse - stalemate/paralysis - when attempting really difficult challenges, such as foreign peacekeeping operations, counter-terror actions,
refugee crises, or responses to military coups, civil wars, or violations of territorial sovereignty outside the EU.

For example, when France specifically invoked the EU’s mutual assistance clause in response to the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, only the UK deployed military force against Islamic State while a few other EU member states (Belgium, Germany, and Sweden) offered limited military support. Most other EU member states, however, failed to offer much ‘mutual assistance’ (and the CSDP was not used at all). The EUGS does not even mention these attacks or the EU’s responses, or whether an attack on EU buildings/personnel (involving terrorists or otherwise) constitutes an attack against the EU itself; this is a major omission considering how many times 'terrorism' is mentioned in the document (32) and considering the March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels, the capital of ‘Europe.’ Similarly, how should the EU deal with member states that commit resources in principle to joint actions but then pull out their forces early or refuse to deploy them at all? Or member states that launch unilateral actions without advance consultation with their EU partners? As a 'common' foreign/security policy does not mean a 'single' policy, the EU may have to learn to live with incoherence, and thus limited credibility in world politics, if it can't find an effective way to deal with these problems. This challenge, among others, is most evident regarding the EU’s track record of managing its single most important external challenge: stabilising its own neighbourhood.

II. Stabilising the neighbourhood: The EU's strategic priority

As the EUGS is full of values, principles, interests, priorities, capabilities, policy tools, and other elements, all of which range in geographic scope around the
globe, it is very easy to lose sight of one simple, yet critical, fact: the EU cannot possibly do all of this, equally effectively, at the same time. In other words, a bigger global strategy does not necessarily mean a better (i.e., more effective and credible) global strategy, and the EU undoubtedly will fail to achieve many of the goals in the EUGS simply because of limited attention and resources. In addition, much of what is new in the EUGS is really about style rather than substance, so we can expect 'business as usual' regarding most of what the EU does in world politics.

To be sure, many of the smaller problems cited in the EUGS are well within the EU's scope of capabilities and have been (or are now) being addressed with increased funding, new institutional mechanisms, and greater coordination among EU member states; these efforts include the European Counter-Terrorism Centre, a Civil Protection Mechanism, a European Medical Corps, and pending European Border Service/Coast Guard. These are still focused largely on the eight security threats noted above; the EUGS also singles out three in particular (terrorism, cyber-security, and energy security). These kinds of problems also might be mitigated if the EU manages to work, in the longer term with mostly diplomatic/economic capabilities, towards more 'cooperative regional orders' and enhanced 'global governance in the 21st century', two of the five priorities noted above.\textsuperscript{xxiv}

The EU's central external strategic problem today, however, can be summarised in terms of 'enhancing state and societal resilience to the East and South', plus an 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crises.\textsuperscript{xxv} If these can be combined into a single strategic focus - building resilience in the EU's neighbourhood to deter or manage crises/conflicts - then this in my view is the most important, but also the most incoherent, part of the entire EUGS, not least because the document does not clearly define 'resilience,' a catchword now used by many other global actors as well as
The EU's approach to resilience also stresses 'reform' even though resilience usually refers to an ability to 'recover' (which may not require 'reform'); this focus also can be criticised for accepting severe problems as a given rather than attempting to diagnose their root causes and then offering effective, sustainable solutions. Beyond those important problems, the key point is that it is the EU's failure to manage its neighbourhood over the past decade or more that has led directly to many of Europe's current difficulties regarding terrorism, migrants/refugees, organised crime, energy security, hybrid threats, and so on. Finally, it also seems clear that if the EU cannot effectively build resilience, stability, and cooperation with its own close neighbours, its internal legitimacy and its credibility as a strategic actor elsewhere could be undermined.

Yet the EUGS addresses this challenge somewhat misleadingly by first noting a 'credible enlargement policy' as a key policy tool, which simply is not credible at all for MENA states as they are not eligible. Although the power of accession might work in time in the western Balkans, it is still somewhat naive in light of the more general 'enlargement fatigue' already felt across the EU, as well as recent events in Ukraine and Turkey, both of which could join the EU in principle but are not likely to in reality, at least for the foreseeable future. Similarly, the discussion of the 'power of attraction' to build resilience in other EU 'neighbours' (i.e., those confined to the ENP) is extremely optimistic, and perhaps even unrealistic, considering the instability in most of the 16 original ENP partners. In fact, out of these 16 partners, only Tunisia and Georgia are mentioned in the EUGS as (possible) 'success stories,' which clearly indicates that the ENP approach has been a dismal failure despite years of EU activity under this framework, which was specifically created to cope with
instability in the east and south in light of the 2004 EU enlargement and was modelled largely on the EU's own accession process.xxx

Beyond the enlargement/ENP domains, a sub-section here also discusses a range of goals to promote resilience in 'surrounding regions.'xxx These goals include reforms to human rights, the security sector, the rule of law, cyber-security, sustainable development, education, health, energy, environment, civil society, and so on; basically a list of all normal state capacities.xxxii Between the lack of clarity regarding credible EU capabilities, and the long list of goals framed (but not clearly prioritised) under the heading of 'resilience', this section is, quite frankly, strategically incoherent. Most importantly, it is still not clear how the EU will face the ongoing challenge of having to choose between supporting autocratic regimes (to promote stability or 'resilience') or supporting EU liberal values that might undermine such regimes (democracy, human rights, and the rule of law). The EU spectacularly failed this challenge with the Arab Spring (through the 'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity'xxxiii) and faced it again after the attempted coup in Turkey because the EU, despite the reduced attention to democracy in the EUGS relative to the ESS, still finds it difficult to balance working with authoritarian regimes against its other values, which in turn undermines its credibility in supporting or, even more difficult, protecting indigenous democratic reform movements.

Similarly, the EUGS notes the emergence of Russia as a 'key strategic challenge', but then simply reiterates the current confusion facing the EU: it 'will not recognise Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of Ukraine', yet offers to cooperate with Russia 'if and when our interests overlap.xxxiv In other words, nothing in the EUGS suggests that the EU, by itself, could compel Russia, under its present leadership, to retreat from Ukraine, or deter Russia from
destabilising other countries within its sphere of influence. As the EU also cannot
'outbid' Russia on its own flanks, partly because the EU cannot make credible
promises compared to Russian ones (or deter Russian threats), the EU can hope only
to support the efforts of NATO in responding to the key Russian 'challenge':
reassuring NATO members most at risk from Russian encroachments, as affirmed at
the 2016 Warsaw Summit. This also means the EU must qualify its ambitions among
its eastern neighbours to avoid encouraging, or even requiring, them to choose
between EU trade pacts or Russian ones.

Finally, the EUGS goal of an 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crises echoes the
discussion of resilience above with more attention to failed states and
human security; it also attempts to go beyond the so-called 'comprehensive approach'
(i.e., using a full range of EU policy tools to address various aspects of a specific
conflict/crisis) with a 'multi-dimensional, multi-phased, multi-level, and multi-lateral'
approach. Various sub-sections here on 'pre-emptive peace', 'security and
stabilisation', 'conflict settlement', and 'political economy of peace' bring in even more
'root causes' to deal with (i.e., human rights violations, development, resource stress,
gender imbalances, etc.). If strategy is supposed to be about priorities, then these
sections of the EUGS leave much to be desired in terms of how the EU should
respond to a particular crisis, which would involve short-term and medium/long-term
capabilities. Even worse perhaps is that while the 2003 ESS specifically noted that
'Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was a strategic priority for Europe,' the EUGS does not give this or any conflict the strategic priority it had in 2003; in fact, if
a single neighbourhood issue deserves such a status in the EUGS, it is most certainly
the problem of Syria (including Islamic State).
III. The credibility deficit

Leaving aside the problems above, while maintaining a strategic focus on the neighbourhood, how does the EU expect to convert its EUGS into policy action? To deal with this challenge, the EUGS itself concludes with a brief overview of this issue in hopes of becoming a more 'common, comprehensive, and consistent' global actor, as the EUGS Review had anticipated. This involves networks, economic weight, and the full range of soft and hard EU policy tools to act in a 'coherent and coordinated way' - the mantra of EU foreign/security policy cooperation for decades and now framed largely as the 'comprehensive approach'. Specifically, the EUGS will be implemented according to these parameters:

A 'credible Union': According to the EUGS, the EU's credibility hinges on its unity, past achievements, power of attraction, effective and consistent policies, and adherence to values. Previous work on 'credible commitments' also suggests that the EU has clear potential as a strategic partner based on its democratic foundations and internal decision-making processes that may make it difficult to renege on agreed policies. However, if the EU's credibility really hinges upon its past achievements, effective policies, and adherence to values, then this claim simply cannot be supported in terms of coping with the main challenge noted above: the 'arc of instability' surrounding the EU. This concern goes well back to the 1970s, and the EU consistently has failed to address it through a range of policy measures (Euro-Arab Dialogue, Middle East Peace Process, Euro-Med Programme, ENP, Eastern Partnership, Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, etc). Relying on such archaic thinking (i.e., the 'power of attraction' and the ENP) to cope with the single most serious external security problem facing the EU today - various crises generated by state weakness/failure on the EU's flanks - is a major deficiency of the EUGS. In
other words, if the ENP approach did not work before the 2011 Arab Spring, the violent collapse of Syria, and the rise of Islamic State, not to mention Russian intervention in two ENP partners (Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014), then why should such an approach work now? Worse, as noted above enlargement has reached its practical limits as a major foreign policy tool outside of the Balkans, so the EU must rely on its ability to project economic and, possibly, limited military/police power. Although the EU has been effective in using force to deal with one major security threat - piracy and state weakness around the Horn of Africa - it has failed conspicuously to do so closer to home in the MENA and the east.

A 'responsive Union': The EUGS calls for the EU 'to respond more rapidly and flexibly' to foreign challenges, highlighting the role of the Lisbon Treaty but also noting the possibility of coalitions of the willing to act under EU authority. This option has been permitted in EU treaties since the 1990s, and was reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty, yet the EU has never managed to act in this manner under the EU's formal rules. Moreover, the fact that the EUGS basically expects that some EU member states will act on their own, in a way that has eluded the EU for years, hardly inspires confidence. The EUGS also rightly notes the continued inability to deploy EU Battlegroups in the service of such operations under the CSDP. Again, the EU's track record in these areas, beyond the Battlegroups failure, is quite limited in terms of launching CSDP peacekeeping/conflict resolution operations, generating military or civilian forces, providing logistical/intelligence support, and so on. Nor has the EU made much use of the CSFP/CSDP more generally in terms of dealing with instability on its eastern and southern flanks; the most extensive CSDP activity has taken place in the Balkans (essentially taking over previous UN and NATO deployments) and
central Africa, which is hardly a strategic priority for the EU relative to its border areas and the Mediterranean.

Civilian capabilities are mentioned as well here, as a 'trademark' of the CSDP, and the EUGS notes a need to broaden the EU's more general 'knowledge base' regarding its global activities, yet again the document does not set down any specific goals or targets or timelines in these realms, except perhaps the related goal to achieve the target of 0.7% of Gross National Income spending on Official Development Assistance (which is of course an indirect, long-term policy tool rather than a short-term crisis response mechanism). Instead, as elsewhere throughout the document, the EUGS speaks in generalities: cooperating, strengthening, encouraging, streamlining, enhancing, investing, and so on (i.e., 'investing in the EU Conflict and Early Warning System'). Most CSDP actions in fact have fallen short of their staffing and/or material requirements, which are provided largely by EU member states, so the EU's autonomy or credibility cannot possibly be enhanced unless the EU addresses this problem explicitly, forcefully, and permanently.

A 'joined-up Union': Finally, the EUGS notes the need to make the EU more coherent in global affairs by 'joining-up' its various institutions and capabilities, as with the 'innovation' of the EU's comprehensive approach to security. However, the EUGS fails to recognise that the comprehensive approach, mainly involving the security-development nexus, is far more rhetoric than reality, meaning that EU civilian and military/police deployments maintain a clear division of responsibility and separate command structures between these realms. Among over 30 CSDP actions since 2003, for example, only the EUNAVFOR Somalia counter-piracy naval operation can be offered as a possible example of the comprehensive approach in action; even worse, unfortunately, is that this is also a major CSDP operation where
the UK - which is now preparing to leave the EU - played a strategically important role given its naval capabilities.\textsuperscript{xlviii} Even in this case, however, the various civilian-military activities pursued under EUNAVFOR Somalia, including two follow-on capacity-building missions (EUCAP Nestor and EUTM Somalia), were planned separately and are conducted under different chains of command. Finally, as most of the EU's neighbourhood involves developing states, the Commission must be seen as a major player in the region, yet it is consistently marginalised when the EU takes 'high politics' actions under the CFSP/CSDP.

In other words, despite a decade of discussion about the EU's comprehensive approach, the EUGS does not outline a model for a single 'joined-up' approach to 'civil-mil' capabilities, involving unified planning, an integrated command structure, and standing resources. Nor does it mention at all any plan to address the respective division of labour between the military/police elements of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and civilian-focused Commission responsibilities (i.e., the security-development nexus, including humanitarian aid and disaster response) that would need to be re-thought to implement the EUGS as hoped. Instead, the EUGS merely takes as a given the complicated division of labour between the Commission and the EEAS/EUMS regarding internal/external action, which effectively prevents more responsive 'joined up' EU action rather than facilitates it.\textsuperscript{xlix} This is one of the most important missed opportunities in the entire document, especially considering not just the need for a true comprehensive approach in EU external civilian-military actions but also the clear erosion of boundaries between external and internal security and the pursuit of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice more generally (or the new 'Security Union'). Again, the EUGS touches upon this point,\textsuperscript{1} but only in terms of generalities.
(i.e., better coordination) and by taking the EU's complicated and even redundant structures for granted rather than attempting to streamline or re-focus them.

Thus, to implement the EUGS properly, and assuming territorial defence is left to NATO, the EU still needs to link its security interests to its socio-economic interests, whether in the form of a strategic culture, strategic concept, or 'Security Union,' to quickly deploy a full range of EU policy tools and resources - from civilian to military - through EU institutions and EU member states. There are some signs that this is happening, yet this effort still does not go far enough in terms of not just the provision of adequate material resources (military and otherwise), but also robust and accountable procedures for deploying multilateral civ-mil forces rapidly, overseeing them, and coordinating their use with other EU policy tools. Around the EU itself, this would involve: 1) conditional reassurance for relatively stable MENA states (Algeria, Jordan, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco); 2) pragmatic or selective engagement, in close partnership with others (perhaps as an 'honest broker' offering major post-conflict assistance and refugee support), with more difficult cases (Egypt, Libya, Syria); and 3) a junior or 'civilian partner' role to NATO with neighbouring states to the east (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) and perhaps the southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), if only temporarily. The EU also will need to calibrate its policies towards these states very carefully and flexibly, which mainly involves the use of soft power tools, and possibly light military/police forces, as the EU’s track record clearly shows that it has very little will for 'hard' military peacekeeping operations. This reluctance to deploy heavy military force on the ground would become even more pronounced if an EU operation ever resulted in mass casualties. Instead, for now the EU may have to support unilateral military
actions by its own member states to secure its neighbourhood, as with France's intervention in Mali.\textsuperscript{liii}

**Conclusion**

The EUGS has been praised for its ambitiousness, its idealism, and its boldness, not least by former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (among others).\textsuperscript{liv} However, idealistic ambitions also have a price for political actors when they fail to live up to their ideals, or deliberately violate them through action or inaction; such actors lose credibility/legitimacy at best and can be accused of hypocrisy at worst. This is especially problematic in democratic polities or international organisations pursuing normative or 'aspirational' goals.\textsuperscript{lv} The EUGS clearly represents some of the EU’s idealist tendencies, yet those ambitions must be balanced against a pragmatic and honest assessment of what the EU realistically can achieve in the face of so many internal and external challenges, especially as the EU already can be accused of hypocrisy, or at least gross insensitivity, in a number of ways: human rights in China and the former Soviet Union, the recent visa deal with Turkey, refugees drowning in the Mediterranean, refugee camps and border walls in Europe, austerity in Greece, arms sales to Africa, etc. Moreover, two potential sources of EU power - the soft power of enlargement and the hard power of offensive military force (including air strikes) - simply are not credible in much of the neighbourhood, while the EU’s maritime security capabilities will diminish if the British Navy does not participate in the CSDP, so the EU must rely on other tools for the foreseeable future. In this light, and considering the wide scope of the EUGS, much of which may amount to wishful thinking, it is important to remind ourselves about the central *raison d'etre* of European integration: fundamentally, the EU is about peaceful
conflict resolution among its own member states across a wide range of issue-areas (or the management of complex interdependence\textsuperscript{li}), a process which generally favours slow, but hopefully more stable, consensus-building. Consensus is especially prized by the EU in the realm of foreign/security policy, where the stakes and risks can be much higher than with internal socio-economic policy. This tendency is also why the EU does not respond very credibly during crisis situations, as consensus (internal conflict resolution) is favoured over effectiveness (decisive external action).

Although the EUGS aims for the ambition of 'strategic autonomy' for the EU, based on its 'credibility', the EU's own foreign/security policy system simply is not equipped to achieve this core aim, whether in terms of formal institutions or standing capabilities.

In short, without greater harmonisation of national approaches to security and defence, and/or a stronger bureaucratic 'core' to act as a policy entrepreneur in terms of planning and conducting joint actions in a consistent fashion, it is still too easy for internal events and the varied interests of EU member states to delay, or even prevent, coordinated action when a foreign crisis hits. The Brexit issue alone, for example, is likely to preoccupy the EU for the next half-decade or more, just as the Lisbon Treaty did. Of course, if the EU just wanted to protect itself while pursing what largely amounts to international social work (development/humanitarian aid), then it should adopt a 'fortress Europe' approach and continue to build walls, physical and otherwise, against foreign threats. However, if the EU really wants to shape the world in its own image, and not 'pull up a drawbridge',\textsuperscript{lvii} because its strategic goals include the liberal virtues of economic openness, equality, democracy, human rights, diversity, and the rule of law, then it must work much harder to secure these values within and around Europe itself. This ongoing effort should be closely coordinated especially on the
EU's bordering regions to help, at the very least, reinforce what will always be the EU’s single most important contribution to global peace and security: leading by example.
NOTES


iii. Such as for Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean under Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union.


vi. From ‘The European Union in a Changing Global Environment’ (June 2015), released by the EEAS (hereafter ‘EUGS Review’), Section 1.3.

vii. Bisco, this issue.

viii. Tocci, this issue.

ix. Howorth, this issue.

x. Note also that the EU has deployed only one (civilian) CSDP mission to Asia so far, the Aceh Monitoring Mission.


xiii. EUGS, Sections 1 and 2.

xiv. EUGS, Section 3.

xv. ESS, p. 11.

xvi. EUGS, p. 4 and p. 10.

xvii. Tocci, this issue.

xviii. EUGS Review, Section 3.


xxii. That is, after experiencing ‘armed aggression’ under the terms of Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty.

xxiii. Article 222 also requires solidarity in the face of a terrorist attack against an EU member state (or a natural disaster), and says the EU ‘should mobilise all the instruments at its disposal’ (including military resources) to respond to the threat.

xxiv. EUGS, pp. 32-44.

xxv. EUGS, pp. 23-32.

xxvi. Wagner & Anholt, this issue.

xxvii. EUGS, p. 25.
The 'original' EU neighbours in the 2003 ENP: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Ukraine, and Tunisia.


Many of these policy sectors are also listed in the original 2003 ENP.


For more on this point, see the special issue of the European Foreign Affairs Review 18/4 (2013).


Through EUNAVFOR Somalia; see Smith, Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy, Chapter 6.

Article 44, which allows for coalitions of willing EU member states to undertake CSDP-related tasks on the behalf of the rest of the EU. The EU also has failed to make use of the Start-Up Fund facility (Article 41.3) to coordinate EU member state contributions to new CSDP actions.

Non-EU member states can participate in CSDP actions, but EU member states are expected to lead them, as the UK did in EUNAVFOR Somalia (and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia). See the EEAS 'EU Concept for Military Command and Control,' Doc. 5008/15 (Brussels: 5 January 2015). The UK also provides one of the five national EU Operational Headquarters for CSDP military operations, along with France, Germany, Greece, and Italy.

On this point, see the symposium on the EEAS in the Journal of European Public Policy 20/9 (2013).

For recent summaries, see Peter Schmidt and Benjamin Zyla (eds.), European Security Policy and Strategic Culture (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); and Chappell, Mawdsley, and Petrov, The EU, Strategy, and Security Policy.

Smith, Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy, Chapter 3.
France's Operation Serval in Mali (followed by Operation Barkhane) was supported by CSDP flanking measures (capacity-building and training); it took just days to organise while EUFOR RCA, the most recent CSDP military peacekeeping operation, required months of difficult debates over force generation.

Javier Solana, 'The EU's bold new strategy,' Project Syndicate website, 21 July 2016.


EUGS, p. 17.