

**Labour Party Adaptation to Multilevel Politics:
Evidence from British General Election Manifestos**

Dr Lynn Bennie
Politics and International Relations
University of Aberdeen

and

Dr Alistair Clark
Politics
University of Newcastle

Accepted for publication in *British Politics*, 30th May 2019

Labour Party Adaptation to Multilevel Politics: Evidence from British General Election Manifestos

Abstract

Some policy areas debated in British general elections are the responsibility of devolved institutions, not the UK parliament. Devolution means that state-wide parties produce different versions of their general election manifestos in the devolved territories. Deploying a multi-level party framework, this article examines intra-party variation in Labour's manifesto content through an original study of British, Scottish and Welsh Labour party manifestos from 2001 to 2017. The analysis focuses on the content and structure of Labour's general election manifestos across the UK. It examines the roles performed by these documents, revealing how the Labour party has responded to the challenges of devolution. The analysis highlights the variable speeds at which sub-state parties embrace autonomy. It finds that Welsh Labour is more inclined to diverge from the content of UK Labour manifestos than the Scottish party, suggesting Scottish Labour has been slow to understand the politics of national identity and reluctant to embrace opportunities created by devolution. The article has implications for three key literatures: approaches to manifesto analysis; the roles performed by party manifestos; and party adaptation in multi-level systems.

Keywords

UK Labour, party manifestos, multi-level politics, party adaptation, Scotland, Wales

**Labour Party Adaptation to Multilevel Politics:
Evidence from British General Election Manifestos**

Devolution means that distinct policy agendas exist in different parts of the UK, and many policies debated in UK general elections do not apply at the sub-state level. Consequently, state-wide parties produce different versions of their manifestos across the UK. It might therefore appear that the modern general election manifesto lacks a clear purpose in devolved settings. This article explores the extent of policy differentiation at the sub-state level in British Labour party manifestos, and examines the *role and relevance* of these manifestos in a multi-level, devolved political system. This is important because the way in which state-wide parties handle policy divergence between the state and sub-state levels in their general election manifestos is an indication of how parties adapt to multi-level conditions.

The British Labour party is of particular interest due to its central position as a state-wide party delivering and governing devolution in the UK. Since the early days of devolution, the electoral fortunes of Scottish Labour, Welsh Labour and the state-wide party have diverged markedly. Now only the third party in Scotland and in opposition at Westminster from 2010, Labour in Wales is a long-term party of government. The content of Labour's general election manifestos offers insight into the party's strategic approach to managing devolution and policy diversity, and why it has been challenged electorally in Scotland.

We begin with a brief discussion of the roles performed by party manifestos, and this is followed by an account of the UK Labour party in the context of multi-level politics. Theoretical accounts of multi-level political parties lead to expectations of increasingly distinctive sub-state profiles within state-wide parties, in both devolved and general elections. The discussion then outlines the methods and approach deployed in the analysis before moving on to address the structural characteristics of Labour's general election manifestos since devolution in 1999, including variation in their treatment

of devolved policy and national identity. Through this comparison of Scottish, Welsh and British versions of the manifestos, we consider the roles they perform for Labour at the sub-state level. Findings highlight Labour's varying strategies in the territories of Britain, and differences in how sub-state parties within a state-wide party organisation embrace autonomy. In this way, we respond to Harmel's (2018) call for more research into how and why manifesto content develops and can vary between and within parties.¹

The role of general election manifestos

Manifestos perform a number of roles (Kavanagh, 1981; Ray, 2007; Harmel, 2018). They are commonly viewed as the basis of mandate theories, containing election pledges which parties promise to implement if elected to government and conferring legitimacy on policies they enact. Manifestos also contribute to responsible party government. Voters can hold a party to account in the subsequent election if it has not delivered on its manifesto pledges. Not all parties are serious contenders for government, however. As a result, manifestos may take on more symbolic significance and be used to highlight a party's broad philosophy, identity and values. Ray (2007: 17) observes that manifestos may also be used as advertisements for parties, aimed not directly at the election to hand, but at building support for some future electoral contest.

Three ideal types of manifestos can be linked to party goals: (i) *Contract/mandate manifestos* prioritise office seeking, containing many specific pledges for the immediate election. They will be associated with parties most likely to form an administration immediately after an election; (ii) *Advertisement manifestos* aim to build support in the immediate election, but also to situate the party for forthcoming elections. This might involve explicit effort to build up credibility for a state-wide election or regionally; and (iii) *Identity/principle manifestos* involve articulation of parties' ideal policies or ideological values. These manifestos are associated with parties unlikely to enter government, either at state or sub-state level, where compromise is unnecessary. In multi-level political systems,

manifestos can also be used to communicate sub-state, regional or local identities (Clark and Bennie, 2018).

These manifesto roles are not mutually exclusive – manifestos can exhibit elements of all three – but various incentives and reasons exist for one role being more prominent than another. Parties with realistic objectives of gaining office may offer more moderate policy proposals than parties with no ambitions to govern, where the emphasis is on articulation of values and policy ideas rather than winning votes or taking office. The dynamic nature of parties’ incentive structures in elections is captured by models which emphasise vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking goals, suggesting that a range of electoral, organisational and institutional conditions shape party strategies (Strom, 1990; Wolinetz, 2002; Dolezal *et al*, 2018).

The implications of devolution for state-wide parties’ general election manifestos, and the roles they perform, have not been widely explored. In most states, parties now operate in complex multi-level environments where institutions have different powers and state-wide parties grant their sub-state organisations varying degrees of policy autonomy (Mazzoleni, 2009; Allen and Mirwaldt, 2010). It is therefore insufficient when assessing parties’ general election strategies to focus solely on the state-wide level. Devolution produces varying patterns of electoral competition and manifestos potentially perform different roles at state and sub-state levels. How parties view institutions impacts upon their goals. A party unlikely to be part of a state-wide government may prioritise the sub-state institution; one dependent on the regional level for representation state-wide may prioritise the state parliament. Multi-level environments mean there can be trade-offs between two or more institutions.

Labour, multi-level politics and general election manifestos

British Labour is a good example of a state-wide party facing diverse electoral competition at different political levels. Table 1 documents the party’s general election results since devolution. Labour was historically strong in both Scotland and Wales. More recently, the fortunes of the party in these

countries have diverged. Scottish Labour's support was eroded by the SNP, culminating in a catastrophic loss of seats in 2015. In 2017, the party recovered somewhat, benefiting from a UK-wide increase in Labour support, and to some degree a decline in the SNP vote relative to the Conservatives. However, Labour finished behind both the SNP and the Conservatives in Scotland. Welsh Labour, in contrast, continues to dominate, attracting close to 50% of votes in 2017. The party's success has been linked with an effective strategy of emphasising 'Welshness' to counter its nationalist competitor (Bradbury, 2015).

TABLE 1

Elections to devolved institutions, employing a more proportional electoral system, underline this story of Welsh Labour resilience. Labour has continuously been in government in Wales since 1999, sometimes alone, sometimes in coalition with the Liberal Democrats or Plaid Cymru, and the party experienced relatively stable leadership from the time Rhodri Morgan became leader in 2000. Following the 2016 Welsh Assembly elections, Labour had 29 from 60 seats, leading to formal cooperation with the one Liberal Democrat Assembly Member.

Labour led the early years of the Scottish Parliament, in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, but from 2007 support fell away. Scottish Labour's leadership lacked continuity. The death of Donald Dewar in office was followed by a rapid turnover of different leaders. (Between 1999 and 2017, there were eight Scottish Labour leaders, compared to the SNP's two.) By 2016 Scottish Labour had been reduced to the third largest party in Scotland, with 24 from 129 seats. For the first time since devolution, Labour was overtaken by the Conservatives.

As in other European countries with federal or multi-level political systems, relationships between levels of government in Britain are complex. The Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly have powers in important areas of public policy, including education, health and social services. Over time, these competences have evolved, enhancing the status of both institutions in stages. However, the Scottish

Parliament has always been the more powerful of the devolved institutions, with Wales playing 'catch-up' over two decades. Indeed, Scotland has provided motivation for advocates of a stronger model of devolution in Wales.

When established, the Scottish Parliament was set apart by its fiscal powers (though a 3p tax varying power was never used). These fiscal levers were later strengthened, most significantly by the 2016 Scotland Act which followed the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. Income Tax, a portion of VAT and some welfare provisions are now devolved. The Welsh Assembly in 1999 was limited in its law-making capacity but more meaningful devolution followed. In 2011, a referendum indicated support for an enhanced model of devolution in Wales. The Wales Act 2017 involved a move towards a reserved powers model of devolution (enacted in Scotland from 1999) and extended financial powers like borrowing and the ability to vary income tax. This also gave the Welsh National Assembly the power to change its name to Senedd. In this way, over two decades in UK politics, devolution has been strengthened and entrenched but the Scottish Parliament continues to have more powers than the Welsh Assembly. With no separate English parliament in the UK, attempts by the Conservative government to introduce measures known as 'English votes for English laws' confirms the asymmetrical nature of devolution in the UK.

Adapting to these changing conditions is challenging for parties. Fabre (2008: 309) notes the tension in state-wide parties 'between party unity, cohesion and centralization on the one hand, and diversity and internal decentralization on the other'. It is *expected* that multi-level political systems lead state-wide party organisations to formally cede power to the sub-state level. Sub-state elites gain flexibility to adapt to local electoral circumstances, particularly when the party competes with ethno-regionalist, autonomist or non-state-wide parties (Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Laffin *et al*, 2007). This can result in notable policy diversity within the same party.

Faced with a significant nationalist presence in Scotland and Wales, Labour has gradually ceded power internally to its sub-state organisations, allowing freedom to develop local policy agendas and profiles.

This has not been easy. While responsible for introducing the devolved institutions, the party itself was centralised and slow to adapt its internal structures (Hassan and Shaw, 2012). Former Labour leader in Scotland Johann Lamont famously claimed that the UK leadership treated the Scottish party like ‘a branch office of London’.² Nevertheless, formal structures have gradually been modified. There has been increasing freedom for the Scottish and Welsh parties in the areas of leadership, candidate selection and policy formation (Laffin *et al*, 2007). The 2011 *Refounding Labour* reforms meant Scottish and Welsh leaders gained formal authority over their parties (previously they were party leaders in the legislatures).

When it comes to the policy content of state-wide general election manifestos, the sub-state parties are perceived to have considerably less latitude and influence than in devolved elections (Carter and Ladrech, 2007; Moon and Bratberg, 2010). In practice, sub-state party elites are charged with adjusting the state-wide general election manifesto to reflect sub-state politics and devolved policy. Regional elites adapt manifestos and make ‘strategic choices over how far to follow the central party line’ (Laffin and Shaw, 2007: 65).

Formal processes are only part of the story, with ‘ideational structures, norms and competing ideologies/discourses’ shaping debates within multi-level parties (Moon and Bratberg, 2010: 55). In other words, informal processes such as sub-state values and discourses are important in understanding intra-party relationships. They suggest a degree of central party tolerance and flexibility in Labour, with the party in Scotland and Wales perceived to have ‘freedom to manoeuvre’ and respond to electoral circumstances (Laffin *et al*, 2007: 104). Whether sub-state elites embrace these opportunities is another question. Although Scottish Labour has more formal organisational autonomy, it has been suggested that Labour in Wales has developed the stronger regional discourse (Moon and Bratberg, 2010; Scully, 2017).

The expectation is of an increasingly distinctive sub-state profile in a state-wide party, in both devolved *and* general elections. Finlayson (2005), for example, points to English-Welsh-Scottish

differences becoming clearer over time. Labour's recent experience of being in opposition at Westminster and in Scotland leads us to expect this process to intensify, as state-wide parties tend to be less controlling when in opposition (Fabre, 2008). Furthermore, as nationalist parties threaten the electoral standing of Labour, we would expect Labour in opposition to develop a clearer sub-state profile. Therefore, more individuality might be expected in Scotland than in Wales. Devolution is stronger and more entrenched in Scotland, Labour has been in opposition for a considerable time, a strong Scottish identity exists amongst voters, and the SNP has experienced a period of unprecedented electoral success. Such conditions, Fabre (2008: 318) argues, 'should strengthen the asymmetry between the Scottish and Welsh branches of the state-wide parties.'

However, there are also reasons to expect Welsh Labour to demonstrate diversity, related to its uninterrupted status in government and relative continuity in leadership. Plaid Cymru has been a less effective challenger party to Labour than the SNP, more narrowly associated with promoting the national language, and independence is seen as less viable by the electorate. As a result, Labour in Wales has enjoyed governing status for a prolonged period, at a time of increasing autonomy for Wales. Being in power can give a sub-state party more clout – more confidence to assert itself – within the national party organisation (Fabre, 2008); and stability in leadership potentially permits a more sustained focus over time.

Data and approach

These issues are explored by examining the content of Labour's general election manifestos. There has been little analysis of territorial diversity in manifestos. They have been used to explore discourses of nationalism in Scotland (Leith, 2008; Leith and Soule, 2011). Shephard (2007) examined Scottish Labour general election manifestos in 2001 and 2005, noting overlap between devolved and reserved issues. However, there have been few attempts to compare the wider content of Scottish, Welsh and British versions of general election manifestos (but see Clark and Bennie, 2018).

Manifesto analysts have been inventive in designing methods to examine them. Different techniques have been deployed to undertake varying forms of content analysis. Most analyses of manifestos focus on party policy positions, relating them primarily to saliency and spatial theories of competition (Budge *et al*, 2001; Mazzoleni, 2009; Allen and Bara, 2017). Often, this takes the form of validating the reliability of measures and methods of coding manifesto content (Laver *et al*, 2003; Ray, 2007; Pappi and Seher, 2009). Less often, manifestos are used as indicators of political culture and elite discourse (Finlayson, 2005; Leith and Soule, 2011).

Work on manifestos has been predominantly quantitative, counting word usage, so-called quasi-sentences, sub-headings and the space given to various topics. Difficulties in doing so have been discussed elsewhere (Budge *et al*, 2001; Laver *et al*, 2003; Ray, 2007). While quantitative content analysis has yielded valuable insights, it can only identify the number of times topics are mentioned, the space allocated to them and so on. It cannot tell us about meanings associated with words, nor how topics are presented to create a particular impression of a party, its goals and the role of the manifesto in an election. A more qualitative approach is required. Allen and Mirwaldt's (2010) analysis of British, German and French manifestos was based on a qualitative reading of selected documents to identify general underlying themes, as they describe:

By actually reading the manifestos ... we were able to analyse mentions of democracy in their full context and to explore more fully changes in the way political parties have talked about it (Allen and Mirwaldt, 2010: 875).

We adopt a similar approach but the qualitative reading of manifestos is complemented with some basic word counts in order to provide a clear sense of differences between manifestos and the roles they perform. British, Scottish and Welsh versions of Labour's manifestos from post-devolution British general elections between 2001 and 2017 are analysed.³ We examine the characteristics and content of the manifestos, with the expectation that Labour has adapted them to take account of devolved circumstances.⁴ Analysis begins with a brief account of sub-state spending on general election

manifestos and then examines the structure, policy content and national identity discourse of the documents. The aim is to explore variation in manifestos in British general elections, to understand their different territorial uses.

Characteristics of Labour general election manifestos

Spending on manifestos

The resources devoted to producing manifestos is an indicator of how parties perceive and utilise their manifestos. In multi-level political systems, spending tends to reflect the relative power of institutions (Bratberg, 2009; Dolezal *et al*, 2012; Brunsbach *et al*, 2012). Table 2 examines Labour expenditure on manifestos in the constituent parts of Great Britain from 2001 to 2015.⁵ By 2015 there had been a marked decline in spending overall, probably due to online distribution. As a proportion of overall spending, expenditure in England gradually rose to 80% by 2010, before falling to 71% in 2015. In 2005 and 2010, the party spent *more* on manifesto production in Wales than in Scotland. However, there was a higher spend in Scotland than in Wales in 2001 and 2015.

TABLE 2

With the SNP expected to dominate after the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, increased spending on the general election manifesto in Scotland suggests some attempt (however futile) to dedicate more resources to Scotland and shore-up party support.⁶ The general pattern of spending suggests that the powers of the respective institutions drive strategic decisions about party spending on manifestos (Clark and Bennie, 2018: 256).

Structural aspects

The structure, style and format of manifestos vary considerably (Merz and Regel, 2011). Manifestos can be leaflet or pamphlet style, like a magazine or brochure, or even take the form of a book, as was the case for the Labour manifesto of 2017. Layout varies, including the use of chapters to separate topics, the inclusion of pictures or photographs, the use of party branding and the manner in which

text is presented. These variations are used by parties to convey messages and themes. Many of these features can be compared across parties and time. Additionally, manifesto length (in pages and words) has been used as a proxy for the importance parties attach to their manifestos (Shephard, 2007; Brunsbach *et al*, 2012).

There appears to be little relationship between the length of Labour manifestos and whether the party is in office, either at the UK or sub-state level (Table 3). As for territorial diversity, the clearest characteristic is the *similarity* of word length across the manifestos, with one exception. In 2010, the Welsh manifesto is considerably shorter. By 2015, the Welsh document is *longer* than its counterparts, and in 2017 the three documents again look similar in length.⁷ The number of chapters each year is near identical but the Welsh manifesto of 2010 has an extra chapter and a distinctive configuration of chapter themes. Instead of specific chapters on health, education and so on, chapters deal with broad themes like ‘protecting services’ or ‘standing up for the many’.

Over time there is similarity in the use of photographs and pictures between the British and Scottish documents. 2010 is again notable in the case of the Welsh manifesto, this time for the proliferation of photographs. A total of fourteen pictures illustrate the document, including images of the Welsh national flag, a castle, wind-turbines, and some ‘ordinary’ members of the public. A shorter manifesto containing illustrations does not necessarily lack substance and can be an effective campaigning document, but it is notable that in 2015 and 2017 *fewer* pictures were printed in the Welsh manifestos. Overall, the use of pictures has fluctuated considerably, but photograph usage in the Scottish case is consistent with the British documents, while Welsh distinctiveness is apparent.

TABLE 3

Each manifesto contains a preface or foreword by the UK leader and, usually, Labour’s Scottish and Welsh leaders. In 2001 all manifesto versions relied heavily on images of the UK leader, Tony Blair, supplemented by a few pictures of sub-state leaders. Prefaces in 2001 and 2005 adopted a consistent

model; an introduction by the UK leader, followed by statements from Scottish and Welsh leaders (First Ministers and Secretaries of State). More recently, the leadership emphasis appears to be changing, with sub-state leaders more prominent (Table 4). In 2010, both British and Scottish manifestos had a brief foreword by the state-wide Labour leader Gordon Brown, himself a Scottish MP. In Wales, the statement by Brown is not used. Instead a foreword was written by Peter Hain, Secretary of State for Wales, and Carwyn Jones, the First Minister for Wales. In 2015, the state-wide leader Ed Miliband is prioritised over the Labour leader in Wales but not in Scotland. By 2017, sub-state figures take precedence with forewords by Labour leaders in Scotland and Wales printed before those of Jeremy Corbyn.

TABLE 4

TABLE 5

The title and structure of the documents provide further insight into sub-state distinctiveness (Table 5). In the immediate post-devolution elections (2001 and 2005) 'Britain' is simply replaced with 'Scotland' or 'Wales'. There is no difference in the titles of Labour manifestos across Britain in 2010. In 2015, Wales adopts the same title as the state-wide party. In 2017 three separate titles are used. What is now widely regarded as an effective Labour manifesto title, 'For the Many Not the Few', did not appear in the Scottish or Welsh documents.

In nearly all years, therefore, the three versions of the manifesto are close to uniform in chapter structure and organisation, but with some symbolic attempts to acknowledge sub-state identities. 2010 was exceptional, with Welsh individuality clear. This uniformity in Labour manifestos points to state-wide, office-seeking motivations at play in a general election. It suggests the dominant role of the manifesto is one of seeking a state-wide contract or mandate. However, a closer examination of the documents' content in the following sections points to other roles being performed

simultaneously by general election manifestos, namely the articulation of a party's identity and advertising for future elections at the sub-state level.

Devolution and policy diversity

A critical question is how state-wide parties handle reserved and devolved policies in their manifestos. In many areas, a complicated inter-relationship exists between devolved policies and those that remain the domain of UK government. Shephard (2007: 187) argues that in 2001 and 2005, 'Labour largely ignored the implications of devolution for the issues that they would campaign on for the Westminster election'. Through comparison of British, Scottish and Welsh versions of general election manifestos over a longer period, we now explore how Labour deals with the policy consequences of devolution.

Devolution addressed

The manifestos directly acknowledge the challenges posed by devolution. Initially, in 2001, there is reference to how devolution has necessitated three versions of the document. The British document explicitly mentions the existence of Scottish and Welsh manifestos, thus: 'The proposals and statistics in this chapter refer to England; reform programmes for Scotland and Wales are detailed in the Scottish and Welsh manifestos' (Labour manifesto, 2001: 18). Early manifestos provided considerable detail on the powers of the UK government and responsibilities of the devolved institutions. In 2010, the Scottish document *adds* an introductory paragraph dealing with reserved and devolved powers:

Scottish Labour will fight every election on our commitment to all those things which matter most to Scottish families and workers; the economy, jobs, crime, schools and hospitals. Devolution means that many of these issues are decided in the Scottish Parliament. Where responsibility is reserved to the UK Parliament, Labour will deliver the commitments made in this manifesto in the next Parliament. Where responsibility is devolved, Scottish Labour will endeavour to deliver for Scotland from opposition in

the Scottish Parliament... We will carry these commitments through into the next Scottish Parliament. (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2010: 0:3)

Latterly, the British manifestos outline commitments to extending the powers of the sub-state institutions, with devolution 'gathering pace' (Labour manifesto 2015: 63). In 2015, this involves a package of reforms to UK government and devolving power to English cities and regions, and a UK Constitutional Convention. These commitments are more detailed in the Scottish and Welsh manifestos. Following the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, there was all-party support for strengthening the Scottish Parliament. This is reflected in the 2015 manifesto, which refers to the energy created by the referendum. The Scottish leader's introduction points to the Scottish Parliament becoming 'one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world', with new powers over tax, jobs, welfare and borrowing (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2015: 6). Welsh Labour's manifesto aims for 'parity with Scotland on the model of devolution' (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2015: 65).

In 2017, there is a slightly different approach. The British document states that constitutional change is pressing due to the outcome of the Brexit referendum, and there will be consideration of federalism. Sections on Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are succinct, containing very little detail. Less than 125 words are dedicated to Wales. Devolution is given more attention in the Scottish and Welsh documents. The Scottish manifesto refers to the threat of another independence referendum. In some places, for example arts policy, the Scottish manifesto points to 'English' proposals and states that it would be up to the Scottish government to decide on whether to 'follow [UK] Labour's lead' (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2017: 93).

The Welsh version highlights new powers for the Welsh Assembly, including over policing. Notable detail, not found in the Scottish document, appears in the chapter on 'Negotiating Brexit', calling for a 'fundamentally different constitutional relationship between the devolved governments and the UK government' when the UK leaves the EU (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2017:23). However, both sub-state documents call for a 'presumption of devolution' where EU powers automatically transfer to the

regions/nations of the UK; and both emphasise that budgetary decisions taken by the UK have knock-on spending effects in devolved areas. Overall, there is considerable detail on devolution and the evolution of the sub-state institutions, with Wales making the case for equality with Scotland.

Policy detail: reserved and devolved areas

The sub-state documents rely heavily on a British template. In reserved policy areas like taxation and international relations the manifestos are close to identical, but the template is modified to reflect Scottish and Welsh contexts, often with very slight modifications in language. A common strategy on reserved matters is to provide details of how state-wide policy is implemented in Scotland and Wales. Throughout the documents, UK figures are provided and then backed up with details on Scotland and Wales. For example, the 2017 Welsh document refers to the recruitment of 10,000 more police officers, which would mean 853 new officers in Wales (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2017: 71).

Devolution means that some public policies proposed for England (in some cases England and Wales) do not apply at the sub-state level. We would therefore expect that 'English' policies would be removed from the Scottish and Welsh documents. This is evident. Sometimes specific policy detail is replaced with a general statement of principle. In 2010, major health policies which do not appear in the Scottish document include private services (alternative service provision) and enhancing patient choice. The discussion is less detailed than its British counterpart, with vaguer commitments.

Whether sub-state parties add accounts of policy developments in the devolved institutions is an important question. In fact, extensive material is added to reflect policies in Scotland and Wales, with quite different accounts of areas like transport, agriculture, tourism and so on. In 2001, Scottish and Welsh manifestos give prominence to free bus travel for pensioners and the disabled, a policy passed by both institutions in the early days of devolution. There are many references to policies introduced 'since 1999'. Sections dealing with public services, health and education depart from the British document, increasingly so from 2010, citing policies 'made in Scotland/Wales', although many phrases and introductions to sentences are similar, revealing continued reliance on a 'master' document.

In 2017, the Scottish party points to ‘English’ Labour’s policy of free school meals for all primary school children to be paid for by removing VAT tax exemption on private schools, and states ‘Scotland would benefit from the Barnett consequential of this policy, which would allow it to be replicated here’ (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2017: 42).

Similarly, Welsh Labour largely follows the British document but emphasises the distinctiveness of Welsh Labour policy. In health, Welsh manifestos emphasise Labour achievements in Wales, from new hospitals to increased staff numbers. The party argues that it defended the NHS against Conservative cuts and rejected top-down reorganisation and privatisation. In 2015 and 2017, unlike Scottish Labour, the party in Wales can argue that it has ‘delivered’ various policies such as increased training opportunities for young people (apprenticeships) and a Living Wage for NHS staff.

Citing recent policy achievements makes the Welsh manifesto more distinctive *and* longer. In the early years of devolution, Scottish Labour was similarly able to describe policies implemented during its time in government, 1997-2007, while avoiding mentioning this was in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Indeed, the extent to which Labour could realistically claim ownership of many policies in Scotland between 1999 and 2007 is questionable. Assessing this period of devolved government, one former Labour Scottish First Minister suggested that ‘the Liberal Democrats have probably gained more from devolution than any other party’ (cited in Laffin, 2007: 665). In opposition, Scottish Labour manifestos contain more critiques of the governing party. The Welsh manifesto, by contrast, continues to praise the government in Wales, with multiple references to the achievement of the ‘Labour-led Assembly government’. Welsh Labour is simply able to report more on sub-state policy delivery.

Throughout, there is a theme of partnership and interdependence between state-wide and sub-state government. In 2005, Scottish Labour (2005: 45) refers to ‘joint responsibility’ between Westminster and Holyrood in crime and policing, and ‘tough new anti-social behaviour legislation in Scotland backed up by national security legislation introduced by the Labour government.’ This acknowledges the interdependence of institutions but leads to confusion about which level of government is being

discussed. 'Our record in government' is frequently stated but it is not always clear which government is being referred to. Reserved and devolved powers are frequently conflated. For example:

'A Tory Government would put at risk much that Welsh families depend on: tax credits for people on modest incomes; free prescriptions; free bus travel for older people; free breakfasts in primary schools, tax-free winter fuel payments.' (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2010: 2).

There is, in sum, clear evidence of Labour outlining a record of past legislative achievements – relating to the state-wide parliament *as well as* the devolved institutions (the latter being not strictly relevant in a British general election). This demonstrates the complexities of devolution, ambiguity in the reporting of policy and a blurring of jurisdictions by parties. It also challenges any suggestion that the only purpose of a general election manifesto is the seeking of a contract or mandate to govern at the UK level. The attention paid to the devolved institutions suggests a state-wide party that is attempting to use its manifestos for more long-term purposes, sending a message about its position at the sub-state level, potentially using a general election manifesto to *advertise* for devolved elections. This idea is explored further in the next section.

Advertising for devolved elections

To what degree does the party outline its policy *plans* at the devolved level? With devolved elections in Scotland and Wales a year later than the 2010 and 2015 general elections, there might be a certain amount of long-term electioneering or positioning, which would be a form of advertising for future elections. There is evidence of this. Proposals from 2010 and 2015 on devolved areas of responsibility go on to appear in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly manifestos of 2011 and 2016. Table 6 demonstrates some of the overlap between the documents, making parts of the general election manifestos look like advertising.

Several approaches are apparent. First, some key general themes are repeated. Secondly, a general commitment in 2010 or 2015 turns into a more concrete, fleshed-out or ambitious proposal in subsequent devolved elections in 2011 or 2016. For example, Welsh Labour in 2015 promises to scale back the Right to Buy Scheme, pointing to ending the scheme in 'the next Assembly term'. The 2016 document confirms the end of the scheme and provides more detail on how this will be achieved.

TABLE 6

Alternatively, some 'devolved' policies are removed or watered down, likely in response to intensifying financial constraints. Between 2010 and 2011, a Scottish commitment on class sizes is removed. Commitments on young people and regeneration of towns become weaker. In 2016, a number of less ambitious proposals appear in the Welsh Assembly document. In housing, the 2015 manifesto promised 200,000 new affordable homes a year by 2020, but the 2016 Assembly document only commits to 20,000 in the next term.

New commitments are also revealed in 2011 and 2016, as in all manifestos, some reflecting changes in strategic direction. In 2016, then Scottish leader Kezia Dugdale introduced a new 'anti-austerity' pledge, a commitment to use the Scottish Parliament's taxation powers to stop cuts to public services. Nevertheless, the manifestos for the devolved elections contain many policies which first appeared in general election manifestos, providing evidence of an advertising function.

Party competition also shapes the content of manifestos to a degree. Another indicator of whether parties in general elections have an eye on devolved elections is how they deal with competitors (Table 7). Until 2017, Scottish Labour manifestos unequivocally presented the Conservatives as their principal opponents. The SNP was mentioned infrequently, the Liberal Democrats not at all. By 2017, the SNP is referred to 39 times. This suggests that ten years after losing power to the SNP at the sub-state level, Scottish Labour eventually recognised a need to respond to the dominant party in Scotland in a UK-wide general election, although the Conservatives are still framed as the main political threat. In

Wales, portraying the Conservatives as the main competitor is even more apparent. This suggests that Labour is focused on the immediate major opponent at the UK level – the Conservatives – but for Scottish Labour there is belated recognition of the SNP’s challenge, in both devolved and Westminster elections.

TABLE 7

So far, the analysis has revealed that Labour’s general election manifestos are a mix of: (i) publicising past achievements in the state-wide *and* sub-state institutions; (ii) publicising policy ideas for Westminster *and* devolved elections; and (iii) criticism of party opponents at Westminster *and* in the devolved settings. This suggests that Labour uses general election manifestos to perform multiple functions, combining immediate office-seeking objectives (the mandate role) with that of situating the party for forthcoming elections in the devolved territories, a form of advertising. These amount to two of the three ideal types of manifesto roles outlined earlier. However, to what extent does a Labour general election manifesto also promote the party’s identity, the third main role? The next section addresses this question by examining the national identity discourse of Labour general election manifestos.

Scotland, Wales, Britain and the Union: Discourse and Identity

State-wide parties have to be British, English, Scottish and Welsh in appeal. The nuanced language of a manifesto provides insight into how parties approach national identity (Leith and Soule, 2011: 42). Table 8 assesses the national identity discourse of Labour manifestos in Scotland and Wales, revealing shifts over time.

In the early years of devolution, the Scottish documents contain more references to Scotland/Scottish than the equivalent terms in the Welsh manifestos. However, in 2010, Welsh Labour intensifies its regional identity, and downplays the theme of ‘Britishness’, using the terms Britain or British rarely (13 times). In 2010, Scottish Labour is almost as likely to refer to Britain, British or the UK as the state-

wide party, and the Scottish party is *most* likely to refer to the Union. Welsh Labour, in sharp contrast, is significantly less likely to refer to Britain or the UK. It does not specifically mention the Union at all, and is twice as likely to use the terms Wales/Welsh as Scottish Labour is Scotland/Scottish. In 2010, again, it is Welsh Labour which demonstrates distinctiveness.

TABLE 8

This leads us to question how the Union is portrayed by the sub-state parties. In 2010, Scottish Labour's commitment to the British union of nations is clear. The Scottish manifesto presents a strong defence of the Union, evoking the image of a social union. It discusses the founding values of the welfare state and its role in 'binding' the nations of the UK:

The welfare state, in its broadest sense, is the most profound expression of the shared values that bind Scotland and the other nations of the United Kingdom together in a social union... A National Care Service would be a further strand in the social union... It will be different in each nation of the UK, but will reflect our shared values. (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2010 6:5).

The Welsh manifesto of 2010 (when Labour was in coalition with Plaid Cymru in Cardiff) is less overt in its 'Britishness', more focused on Wales. There is a stand-alone chapter on 'A strong, open, self-confident Wales', which celebrates 'Wales' diverse, modern culture'. There is extensive discussion of pride in the Welsh language, portrayed as a 'vital element of Welsh self-confidence', and devolution is described as bringing a 'new sense of Welsh identity' (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2010: 23).

By 2015, a recalibration has occurred. In the Welsh document, usage of the terms British/Britain has increased again and in 2017 has the same frequency as the Scottish manifesto. Over time both Scottish and Welsh Labour make more use of the term UK/United Kingdom, but alongside an increase in nation-specific language (Scotland/Scottish or Wales/Welsh). However, in 2017 Welsh Labour remains

considerably more likely to refer to Wales/Welsh than Scottish Labour is to use the equivalent terms, appearing no less than 441 times in the Welsh manifesto.

The analysis suggests that the Labour party in Wales has overcome an early ambivalence towards devolution. It confirms the existence of a 'Welsh way', promoted by Rhodri Morgan, Welsh First Minister between 2000 and 2009, widely interpreted as a distancing from UK Labour (Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Bradbury, 2015). Despite the weaker model of devolution in Wales, Welsh Labour has a history of 'not following the (UK) government's lead' on public sector reform (Laffin *et al*, 2007: 66). Moon and Bratberg (2010: 57) point to a different Welsh Labour discourse, or 'clear red water' between it and the state-wide party, a phrase first used by Morgan in a speech in 2004 and attributed to his adviser, Mark Drakeford, Welsh Labour First Minister from December 2018.⁸ Scully (2017) similarly describes a 'Welshing-up' strategy, with a clear emphasis on the Welsh Labour leader (then Carwyn Jones), and a 'wholly separate Welsh manifesto'.

Leith and Soule (2011: 55, 59) state that Labour in Scotland adopted a 'low-level nationalist stance', a 'mildly nationalist-neutral position', which contrasted vividly with the SNP. Our analysis echoes this theme. Scottish Labour has at times been *limited* in its nationalist discourse, both in comparison with the competitor nationalist party and with Welsh Labour. It has been reluctant to employ manifestos as statements of sub-state or Scottish identity. It is only in 2017, three years on from the 2014 independence referendum, that there is any significant discussion of independence (explaining why the party is against a second referendum on secession).

There are therefore signs that Scottish Labour is now aware of the importance of national identity discourse and is prepared to speak the language of its competitors in Scotland. After nearly two decades of devolution, it appears that the party is finally showing flexibility at the sub-state level, fostering the development of a sub-state identity in its manifestos. These findings confirm that Labour's general election manifestos are *multi-functional*. While the state-level mandate function

appears to be the dominant role, the manifestos also advertise for devolved elections and transmit the party's sub-state identities.

Conclusion

This article has addressed the roles performed by state-wide party manifestos and how modern parties adapt to multi-level settings. Through a detailed, original reading and analysis of manifesto content, it has demonstrated that there is considerable value in qualitative analysis of manifestos. This has shown how manifesto structure, content and design can be used to convey particular messages and meanings to voters. Such an approach complements, but also moves the debate beyond, quantitative accounts of policy position and salience. Through a multi-level party framework, the article has uncovered how state-wide parties develop different territorial emphases in general elections, in a far from uniform manner. The various roles of manifestos – from mandate through to advertising and identity functions – and how these are balanced lay bare the strategic priorities and choices made by territorial party organisations. What is striking about the Labour case is how slow Scottish Labour appears to have been to adapt to the challenges posed by the party's nationalist competitors. By contrast, Welsh Labour has carved out a clear identity within the broader party which has kept Labour at the forefront of Welsh politics. Similar analyses can be made for other parties, in different settings. Instead of treating parties as unified state-level actors, manifesto analysts should reflect the messier form of multi-level political organisation found in most states and take account of how parties actually campaign in contemporary democracies. This would develop our comparative understanding of parties and their manifestos yet further.

¹ We are grateful to participants at the March 2018 'Manifesto Co-ordination in Multi-Level Settings' workshop at Université Libre de Bruxelles and Waseda University for feedback on an earlier version of this paper. We are also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments.

² See: 'Johann Lamont resignation: Scottish Labour leader stands down immediately', BBC News, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-29765415> [25/2/2019].

³ For consistency, we refer to the British manifesto throughout because it covers state-wide issues and matters reserved to Westminster, even though, with policy areas devolved to Scotland and Wales, it is often referring to England.

⁴ See Appendix Table A1 for a full list of manifestos analysed.

⁵ 2017 figures were not available at the time of writing. We are grateful to Katie Hamilton at the Electoral Commission for providing the 2015 data.

⁶ Labour lost 40 Scottish seats in 2015.

⁷ We refer only to the English-language version of the Welsh Labour manifestos in this paper.

⁸ We are grateful to one of the reviewers for this point.

References

Allen, N. and Bara, J. (2017) 'Public Foreplay' or Programmes for Government? The Content of the 2015 Party Manifestos. *Parliamentary Affairs* 70 (1): 1-21.

Allen, N. and Mirwaldt, K. (2010) Democracy-Speak: Party Manifestos and Democratic Values in Britain, France and Germany. *West European Politics* 33 (4): 870-893.

Bradbury, J. (2015) Wales: Still a Labour Stronghold but Under Threat? In A. Geddes and J. Tonge (eds.) *Britain Votes 2015*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.101-116.

Bratberg, Ø. (2009) Institutional Resilience Meets Critical Junctures: (Re)allocation of Power in Three British Parties Post-Devolution. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 40 (1): 59-81.

Brunsbach, S., John, S. and Werner, A. (2012) The Supply Side of Second-Order Elections: Comparing German National and European Election Manifestos. *German Politics* 21 (1): 91-115.

Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (eds.) (2001) *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carter, E. and Ladrech, R. (2007) Government Change, Organizational Continuity: The Limited Europeanization of British Political Parties. In T. Poguntke, N. Aylott, E. Carter, R. Ladrech and K.R. Luther (eds.) *The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 57-85.

Clark, A. and Bennie, L. (2018) Parties, Mandates and Multilevel Politics: Sub-National Variation in British General Election Manifestos. *Party Politics* 24 (3): 253-264.

Dolezal, M., Ennser-Jedenastik, L., Muller, W.C. (2012) The Life Cycle of Party Manifestos: The Austrian Case. *West European Politics* 35 (4): 869-895.

Dolezal, M., Laurenz, E.J. and Muller, W.C. (2018) Beyond salience and position taking: How political parties communicate through their manifestos. *Party Politics* 24 (3): 240-252.

Fabre, E. (2008) Party Organization in a Multi-level System: Party Organizational Change in Spain and the UK. *Regional and Federal Studies* 18 (4): 309-329.

Finlayson, A. (2005) Forward not back, the Labour Party manifesto 2005. *Renewal* 13 (2/3): 14-21.

Harmel, R. (2018) The how's and why's of party manifestos: Some guidance for a cross-national research agenda. *Party Politics* 24 (3): 229-239.

Hassan, G. and Shaw, E. (2012) *The Strange Death of Labour Scotland*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hopkin, J. and Bradbury, J. (2006) British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 36 (1): 135–152.

Kavanagh, D. (1981) The Politics of Manifestos. *Parliamentary Affairs* 34 (1): 7-27.

Laffin, M. (2007) 'Coalition Formation and Centre-Periphery Relations in a National Political Party: The Liberal Democrats in a Devolved Britain', *Party Politics*, 13, (6), pp651-668.

Laffin, M. and Shaw, E. (2007) British Devolution and the Labour Party: How a National Party Adapts to Devolution. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9 (1): 55-72.

Laffin, M., Shaw, E. and Taylor, G. (2007) The New Sub-national Politics of the British Labour Party. *Party Politics* 13 (1): 88-108.

Laver, M., Benoit, K., and Garry, J. (2003) Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data. *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 311-331.

Leith, M.S. (2008) Scottish National Party Representations of Scottishness and Scotland. *Politics* 28 (2): 83-92.

Leith, M.S. and Soule, D.P.J. (2011) *Political Discourse and National Identity in Scotland*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Mazzoleni, M. (2009) The Saliency of Regionalisation in Party Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Regional Decentralisation in Party Manifestos. *Party Politics* 15 (2): 199-218.

Merz, N. and Regel, S. (2011) 'Approaching Manifesto Production Processes and Functions: A Manifesto Document Typology', Paper to ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop 'the How and Why of Party Manifestos', St. Gallen, April 2011.

Moon, D.S. and Bratberg, O. (2010) Conceptualising the Multi-Level Party: Two Complementary Approaches. *Politics* 30 (1): 52-60.

Pappi, F.U. and Seher, N.M. (2009) Party Election Programmes, Signalling Policies and Salience of Specific Policy Domains: The German Parties from 1990 to 2005. *German Politics* 18 (3): 403-425.

Ray, L. (2007) Validity of Measured Party Positions on European Integration: Assumptions, Approaches, and a comparison of Alternative Measures. *Electoral Studies* 26 (1)11-22.

Scully, R. (2017) It's no fluke poll – Labour is heading for a landslide in Wales, *New Statesman*, 02 June, <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/june2017/2017/06/june-2017-whats-worth-staying-election-night>

Shephard, M. (2007) Multiple Audiences, Multiple messages? An Exploration of the Dynamics between the Party, the Candidates and the Various Constituencies. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 17 (2): 181-201.

Strom, K. (1990) A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Parties. *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (2): 565-598.

Wolinetz, S.B. (2002) Beyond the Catch-All Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies. In R. Gunther, J. R. Montero and J.J. Linz (eds.) *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.136-165.

Table 1: Labour's general election results since 2001

	England			Scotland			Wales		
	% Vote	% seats	N seats	% vote	% seats	N seats	% vote	% seats	N seats
2001	41.4	61.0	323	43.3	77.8	56	48.6	85.0	34
2005	35.5	54.1	286	39.5	69.5	41	42.7	72.5	29
2010	28.1	35.8	191	42.0	69.5	41	36.2	65.0	26
2015	31.6	38.6	206	24.3	1.7	1	36.9	62.5	25
2017	41.9	42.6	227	27.1	11.9	7	48.9	70.0	28

Source: House of Commons Research Papers

Table 2: Labour manifesto expenditure in UK general elections, by region

	2001		2005		2010		2015	
	£000's	% total	£000's	% total	£000's	% total	£000's	% total
England	397	76	261	73	276	80	66	71
Scotland	65	13	47	13	32	9	15	16
Wales	57	11	49	14	37	11	12	13
<i>Total</i>	<i>519</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>357</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>345</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>100</i>

Source: Electoral Commission Register of Campaign Expenditure, <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/>

Note: The expenditure category is D, Manifestos and party political documents.

Table 3: Features of Labour general election manifestos

	2001			2005			2010			2015			2017		
	Brit	Scot	Wales												
N pages	44	44	44	112	112	113	75	74	52	86	96	87	123	119	113
N words	30,807	28,681	28,494	24,012	24,063	23,538	30,277	28,466	13,901	18,964	18,304	21,463	24,560	23,733	25,480
N chapters	5	5	5	9	9	9	10	10	11	7	7	7	13	13	13
N pictures	34	37	34	1	1	1	0	0	14	24	24	15	41	37	21
<i>-UK leader</i>	6	6	5	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	4	2	1
<i>-Regional figure</i>		2	3		0	0		0	0	0	2	1	0	2	4

Table 4: Foreword/preface of Labour general election manifestos

	Britain	Scotland	Wales
2001	Lab Leader (Blair)	Lab leader (Blair); Sec of State for Scotland (Liddell) & First Minister (McLeish)	Lab leader (Blair); First Minister (Morgan) & Sec of State for Wales (Murphy)
2005	Lab Leader (Blair)	Lab Leader (Blair); Sec of State for Scotland (Darling) & First Minister (McConnell)	Lab Leader (Blair); Sec of State for Wales (Hain) & First Minister (Morgan)
2010	Lab Leader (Brown)	Lab Leader (Brown)	Sec of State for Wales (Hain) & First Minister (Jones)
2015	Lab Leader (Miliband)	Scottish Lab Leader (Murphy); Lab Leader (Miliband)	Lab Leader (Miliband): Welsh Lab leader and First Minister of Wales (Jones) & Shadow Secretary of State for Wales (Smith)
2017	Lab Leader (Corbyn)	Scottish Lab leader (Dugdale); Lab leader (Corbyn)	Welsh Lab leader and First Minister of Wales (Jones); Lab leader (Corbyn)

Table 5: Titles of Labour manifestos

	Britain	Scotland	Wales
2001	Ambitions for Britain	Ambitions for Scotland	Ambitions for Wales
2005	Britain Forward not Back	Scotland Forward not Back	Wales Forward not Back
2010	A Future Fair For All	A Future Fair For All	A Future Fair For All
2015	Britain Can Be Better	Scottish Labour Manifesto	Britain Can Be Better
2017	For the Many Not the Few	Together We're Stronger	Standing Up for Wales

Table 6: Policies in 2011 and 2016 Scottish Parliament/Welsh Assembly manifestos appearing a year earlier in general election manifestos

Scotland 2011
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cancer care right to see a specialist and get results within two weeks • Tackling knife crime, with a minimum mandatory sentences for carrying knives • A Victims' Commissioner • In schools, commitment to 2 hours PE per week (5 hours in 2010 British document) • A ban on snaring
Scotland 2016
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No tuition fees for Scottish students • Anti-fracking (cautious approach in 2015, moves to outright ban by 2016) • Every primary school to have breakfast club (2015 talked of a pilot scheme) • Investment in 30,000 apprenticeships each year. (In 2015, reference to 'thousands more'). • Anti-independence but support for the new powers coming to Scottish Parliament
Wales 2011
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commitment to renewables and low carbon economy and communities • Increase spending on education (more detail in 2011, including doubling numbers with access to Flying Start programme) • Cancer Key Worker • National Literacy Plan • Continuation of free prescriptions
Wales 2016
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased spending on health and social services • Improving road networks in Wales • Prioritising mental health treatment • Increased funding for schools; continuation of 21st century schools building programme • Keeping student fees as low as possible: 2016 involves a 'better package of student support, based on recommendations of the Diamond Review'

Table 7: Reference to other parties

	Britain					Scotland					Wales				
	01	05	10	15	17	01	05	10	15	17	01	05	10	15	17
Conservatives/Tories	39	27	14	13	75	47	32	17	13	59	47	34	31	40	80
Lib Dems	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
SNP/Plaid/Nationalists	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	10	39	3	0	3	0	0

Table 8: Britain and the Union (number of times terms used)

	Britain					Scotland					Wales				
	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017
Britain/British	153	86	132	72	83	106	74	112	51	76	147	75	13	78	76
UK/United Kingdom	36	30	25	15	30	38	52	41	48	96	36	39	37	68	109
Union/Unionist*	1	0	2	3	0	1	0	6	1	1	1	0	0	5	0
Scotland/Scottish	10	2	3	8	15	256	249	185	236	280	3	2	2	5	13
Wales/Welsh	10	3	7	11	14	3	3	5	0	4	204	216	360	335	441
England/English* *	9	8	4	12	15	7	3	7	4	11	11	3	7	26	31
Devolution/ de- volved powers to Scotland & Wales	4	12	4	7	14	3	15	11	16	15	13	18	4	21	20

*Excludes references to Northern Ireland/European Union/Trade Union. **Excludes references to English language

Table A1: General election manifestos analysed

Labour Party (British)	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017
Scottish Labour Party	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017
Welsh Labour Party	2001	2005	2010	2015	2017

Note: All party manifestos used in the analysis are publicly available documents

WORD COUNT: 8,964 inclusive of all references and tables

SUBMISSION DATE: 30 September 2018

REVISIONS SUBMITTED: 14 March 2019

ACCEPTED: 30 May 2019