Seki, Erika2005-10-112005-10-112004-100143 4543http://hdl.handle.net/2164/9This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption.636400 bytesapplication/pdfenprice discriminationfisheriesalternating duopolydurable goodsWorking Paper